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Punitive Damages in Cyberspace: Where in 
the World is the Consumer? 
Michael L. Rustad∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION** 
The Internet offers American consumers a global 
marketplace open 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.  By 2004, 
online commerce is projected to account for nearly seven trillion 
dollars.1  Currently, there are 262.3 million English-speaking 
Internet users with 280 million projected for 2004.2  The 
worldwide online population is projected to be between 709 and 
945 million.3  In the United States there are 182.1 million people 
online, accounting for 65% of that population.4  ìWith the ability 
to reach millions of Internet users simply by establishing a 
website, tens of thousands of companies are expected to take 
advantage of electronic commerce, ëredefining and restructuring 
the distribution of goods and services.íî5 
 
∗ Michael L. Rustad, Ph.D., J.D., LL.M. is the Thomas F. Lambert Jr. Professor of Law 
and Co-Director of the Intellectual Property Law Concentration at the Suffolk University 
Law School in Boston.  Sandra Paulsson, who is a law graduate of the University of Lund 
in Sweden and an LL.M. student at Suffolk, provided excellent research and editorial 
assistance.  I would also like to thank my wife, Chryss J. Knowles, for her editorial 
suggestions.  Finally, I would like to express sincere appreciation to my research 
assistants Michael J. Bauer and Patty Nagle for their diligence, and to the entire 
Chapman Law Review staff, and in particular to Kenny Saffles, Brian Bedinghaus, Trent 
Evans, Sherry Fuller, Kevin Morriss, Steve Ruden, and Matt Taylor for  their efforts in 
editing this article. 
∗∗ The research for this article included examining several cases only available in jury 
verdict databases and jury verdict reporting publications.  These cases were obtained 
from LEXIS, Verdict Library, Allver File; and WESTLAW, LRP-JV database (Jury 
Verdict and Settlement Summaries).  Citations to these jury verdict databases are made 
to the LEXIS or WESTLAW database. 
 1 Forrester Projects $6.8 Trillion for 2004 ($ B), Global Reach, at 
http://glreach.com/eng/ed/art/2004.ecommerce.php3 (last revised Nov. 23, 2001). 
 2 Global Internet Statistics (by Language), Global Reach, at http://www.glreach.com/ 
globstats/ (last revised Sept. 30, 2003). 
 3 CyberAtlas staff, Population Explosion!, ClickZ Network, at http://www.clickz.com 
/stats/big_picture/geographics/print.php/5911_151151 (Sept. 22, 2003). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Brian K. Epps, Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.: The Expansion of Personal 
Jurisdiction in the Modern Age of Internet Advertising, 32 GA. L. REV. 237, 239 (1997) 
(quoting Louise Kehoe, Surge of Business Interest, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 1, 1995, at 
XVIII). 
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The risks to consumers in this global marketplace are many.  
Consumers are flooded with virus-infected e-mail, spam, and a 
variety of fraudulent online scams.  Online criminals use the 
technique of ìphishingî to trick consumers into giving their credit 
card numbers by sending fraudulent e-mails posing as banks, 
financial service providers, or Internet Service Providers (ìISPî).6  
The e-mails often have direct hyperlinks to unaffiliated web sites 
that mirror the sites of trusted institutions.7 
The Internet makes it effortless for impostors to assume 
false identities, and therefore, it is a seamless haven for identity 
theft.  The seamy side of the Internet is rapidly becoming a 
global Petri dish for new torts and crimes perpetrated against 
consumers.  Consumers face a multitude of potential risks as the 
result of unsavory practices by Internet retailers.  The following 
three horror stories illustrate the systematic ways wrongdoers 
are preying upon consumers in cyberspace: 
The Naked Internet ConsumeróIn June of 2001, Eli Lilly 
and Co. inadvertently released the e-mail addresses of 669 
medical patients who had registered at its web site8 to receive 
messages regarding health-related matters, such as reminders to 
take certain medications.9  Eli Lilly settled with the states, but 
no individual obtained a damages award in this significant 
compromising of consumer privacy.10 
Consumers as ìPhishî Food in Online AuctionsóThe 
majority of consumer frauds arise out of online auction sales.11  
This is due in large part to online fraudsters who use a technique 
called ìphishingî to defraud consumers who use eBay.12  When 
phishing, a con artist sends a consumer what appears to be an 
ìëofficialí e-mail message directing the person to a counterfeit site 
where they are encouraged to ëupdate their account.íî13  The 
 
 6 Cade Metz, Can E-Mail Survive?, PC MAG., Feb. 17, 2004, at 65, 66. 
 7 Troy Wolverton, Wells Fargo Latest Target in Scams, CNET News.com, at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1017-857177.html (last modified Mar. 11, 2002). 
 8 Eli Lilly Strikes Deal Ending E-Mail Privacy Suit by Eight States, 4 E-BUS. L. 
BULL. 14, 14 (2002) [hereinafter Eli Lilly]. 
 9 Julekha Dash, ACLU Knocks Eli Lilly for Divulging E-Mail Addresses, 
Computerworld, http://www.computerworld.com/managementtopics/ebusiness/story/0,108 
01,62050,00.html (July 9, 2001). 
 10 The settlement of the e-mail privacy lawsuit was with the states of California, 
Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont.  Eli Lilly, 
supra note 8, at 14. 
 11 Internet Fraud Statistics, National Fraud Information Center, at 
http://www.fraud.org/2002intstats.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Internet 
Fraud Statistics]. 
 12 eBay Email Hoax and Web Page, at http://www.millersmiles.co.uk/identitytheft/10 
1303ebay1.htm (Oct. 13, 2003) (noting that since October 2003 there has been a hoax web 
page to capture consumer information). 
 13 Kyle Stock, Auction Site Can Turn Crime Scene for Unwary, POST & COURIER 
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criminal uses the information provided by the consumer to hijack 
his or her credit card and identity.14  A survey of Internet fraud 
found that online auctions accounted for 90% of consumer losses 
in 2002.15  The governmentís Internet Fraud Complaint Center 
reports that online auction fraud has comprised 46% of complaint 
referrals since 2000.16 
Stalking Children in the Internetís Red Light DistrictóCon 
artists frequently target children online.  In one instance, a 
notorious ìtyposquatterî registered domain names that employed 
misspellings of other popular Internet domain names for 
children-oriented websites, such as Teletubbies and Disneyland, 
in order to attract children to adult entertainment sites.17  When 
children accidentally misspelled the domain names for the 
childrenís sites, they were redirected to adult entertainment sites 
where fees were automatically charged for each childís click 
stream.18 
As demonstrated by the above examples, many of the online 
injuries suffered by consumers are the product of truly 
reprehensible wrongdoing deserving of punitive damages.  This 
Article presents the results of the first empirical study of the role 
that punitive damages have played in redressing consumer 
injuries during the first decade of Internet-related litigation.  It 
provides definitive data on the number, size, post-verdict history, 
and factual circumstances underlying punitive damages in 
cyberspace.  Currently, punitive damages play no meaningful 
role in protecting consumers in cyberspace despite the epidemic 
of wrongdoing that goes undetected and unpunished by public 
authorities. 
Tort law has always evolved to address new forms of 
misbehavior.  In the latter half of the twentieth century punitive 
damages were awarded against product manufacturers who 
 
(Charleston, S.C.), Dec. 26, 2003, at 1A, 11A, available at 
http://www.charleston.net/stories/122603/loc_26ebay.shtml. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Internet Fraud Statistics, supra note 11. 
 16 NATíL WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR. & FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, IFCC 2002 
INTERNET FRAUD REPORT 3 (2003), available at 
http://www.ifccfbi.gov/strategy/statistics.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2003) [hereinafter IFCC 
2002 INTERNET FRAUD REPORT]. 
 17 US Authorities Redirect ëMost Wantedí Cybersquatter to Jail, INTERNET MAG. 011 
(Nov. 2003) (ìJohn Zuccarini registered common misspellings of the names of popular 
childrenís websites . . . and earned up to $1 million (£600,000) per year in affiliate 
commissions by redirecting people to pornographic websites.  Visitors to the sites were 
often trapped by pop up ads, forcing them to reboot their computers.î), 
http://web2.infotrac-custom.com/pdfserve/get_item/1/s4waebw3_2/sb635_02.pdf 
[hereinafter US Authorities]. 
 18 Feds Nab Alleged Porn Piper, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/04/tech/ 
printable571499.shtml (Sep. 4, 2003). 
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knowingly marketed their products with excessive, preventable 
danger.19  Tort remedies have the potential of filling the gap left 
by ineffective criminal sanctions against cyberwrongs such as 
online stalking.20 Public enforcement needs to be augmented by 
consumers operating as ìprivate attorneys generalî21 who pursue 
punitive justice against corporate wrongdoers.  ìThe primary 
function of punitive damages is to punish, to deter private actors 
from making particularly egregious decisions harmful to 
society.î22 
Part II examines the case characteristics of Internet lawsuits 
where plaintiffs initiated causes of action in state and federal 
courts in the United States between 1992 and 2002.23  The 
analysis of plaintiffsí victories in Internet cases has a domestic 
focus, employing a database that includes virtually all U.S. 
plaintiff victories in Internet cases.  This database permits the 
first comprehensive examination of: (1) the frequency of punitive 
damages in Internet cases; (2) the specific causes of action on 
which the remedy was based; (3) plaintiff and defendant 
characteristics; and (4) the role punitive damages plays in the 
cyber-litigation system.  A content analysis of all Internet-related 
cases reveals that no consumer obtained punitive damages 
during a decade of cyberlaw litigation.24 
 
 19 See Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing 
Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 16, 18 nn.87-88 (1992) (noting 
that punitive damages in products liability cases evolved as a remedy beginning in the 
mid-1960s). 
 20 Lisa A. Karczewski, Comment, Stalking in Cyberspace: The Expansion of 
Californiaís Current Anti-Stalking Laws in the Age of the Internet, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 
517, 518 (1999) (arguing that the legal system has yet to develop effective remedies 
against online stalking). 
 21 Judge Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals coined the term 
ìprivate Attorney Generals [sic]î to refer to ìany person, official or not,î who brought a 
proceeding ìeven if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest.î  Associated Indus. 
of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).  
See generally Michael L. Rustad, Smoke Signals from Private Attorneys General in Mega 
Social Policy Cases, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 511, 518 (2001) (arguing that ì[t]he rubric under 
which all the definitions for the private attorneys general fall is the emphasis on private 
action for the public interest.  It is only the possibility of private attorneys general 
receiving a contingency fee that permits lawsuits to be brought to vindicate the public 
interestî). 
 22 In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 23 The only foreign cases included in the research universe were lawsuits filed 
against non-U.S. defendants in state or federal courts. 
 24 The definition of a consumer for purposes used in this study is used by many state 
and federal statutes.  A consumer transaction in cyberspace includes commercial 
transactions in which an individual is purchasing goods or services online for personal, 
family or household use.  The definition of consumer is widely accepted and incorporated 
in such consumer statutes as the Truth in Lending Act (ìTILAî).  TILAís scope is limited 
to ìconsumerî credit transactions, which are defined as transactions in which ìthe money, 
property, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, 
family, or household purposes.î  15 U.S.C. ß 1602(h) (1998). 
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At present, punitive damages serve as a form of corporate 
self-help to assist corporations in protecting rights and 
consolidating market share in cyberspace.  Part III explores the 
reasons why punitive damages have not yet developed as a 
consumer protection remedy in cyberspace.  This Article will 
demonstrate that punitive damages are a necessary deterrent 
against Internet wrongdoers where the probability of discovery is 
low and the harm to consumers is generally undetected and 
unpunished by public authorities. 
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN 
CYBERSPACE 
A. Research Methods  
To obtain a more complete understanding of the roles that 
judges and juries play in the rapidly evolving arena of cyberspace 
litigation, all Internet-related cases in which a plaintiff received 
a punitive damages award were surveyed.  This database of 
punitive damages awards in cyberspace was drawn from a 
variety of published and unpublished court opinions from the 
decade of 1992 to 2002.  The appendix to this article describes the 
research methods and sources consulted to assemble the 
database on punitive damages in cyberspace.  The research 
universe for this study is all Internet-related cases decided in 
state and federal courts during the first decade of Internet 
litigation.25  Each of the reported findings is drawn from a larger 
universe of 484 cases in which plaintiffs received legal or 
equitable relief in an Internet-related case in a U.S. state or 
federal court between 1992-2002.  The research findings reported 
below focus upon the cases in which prevailing cybertort 
plaintiffs received a punitive damages award. 
 
 
 
 
 25 For each Internet case, background information and data was compiled on the 
characteristics of plaintiffs, defendants, size of awards, and post-trial adjustments. 
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B. Research Findings 
1. Punitive Damages in Cyberspace Are Increasing and 
Being Awarded at a Higher Rate than in Traditional Tort 
Caseloads 
 
Table One 
Internet-Related Punitive Damages Awarded
                         1992-2002
                                    N=49
Year of Plaintiff Win
2002200120001999199819971996
C
ou
nt
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
 
Table One depicts the forty-nine Internet related cases in 
which a plaintiff received a punitive damages award in all state 
and federal courts for the decade ranging from 1992 to 2002.  The 
overall rate of punitive damages was roughly 10% of all Internet 
cases (49 of 484) in which either equitable or legal remedies were 
granted. Punitive damages are far more likely to be awarded in 
cybertort cases in which at least some monetary award was 
made.  In the 187 cyberspace cases where money damages were 
awarded, punitive damages were also assessed in 49 cases (26%). 
Table One suggests that the overall rate of punitive damages 
is greater in the Internet realm than in the real space world.  All 
of the empirical studies of punitive damages agree that the rate 
of punitive damages is less than one in ten in cases where the 
RUSTAD FINAL - MAY 28 5/28/2004 4:30 PM 
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plaintiff prevailed.26  The most comprehensive study of punitive 
damages in state courts was completed by researchers at the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics (ìBJSî).27  The BJS study of civil 
courts of seventy-five of the largest American counties found that 
ì[o]f the 12,026 verdicts in the sample, plaintiffs won a total of 
364 punitive damages awards,î which was less than 6% of the 
cases.28  All prior empirical studies of the rate of punitive 
damages confirm that the overall rate is substantially lower than 
in cyberspace cases.29  The higher overall rate of punitive 
damages may be explained by the fact that every case involved a 
defendant whose conduct was intentional.  Another explanation 
would be that many of the cases involved repeat offenders such 
as spammers, pornographers, or wrongdoers who fled the 
jurisdiction. 
Still, there were less than fifty punitive damages awards in a 
decade in all state and federal courts.  The high-water mark for 
punitive damages in Internet cases occurred in 2001 with a total 
of only fifteen awards in all state and federal courts.  As these 
numbers demonstrate, punitive damages are still a thimble-full 
of cases in the ocean of litigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26 As one scholar reports: 
Studies conducted by researchers at the RAND Corporation found that 
punitive damages are only awarded in 1-8% of civil cases.  Other studies have 
found punitive damages to be awarded at similar rates.  In the sample of cases 
examined by Daniels and Martin, punitive damages were awarded in only 4.9% 
of civil cases and in 8.8% of cases in which the plaintiff prevailed. 
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and 
Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 161 (2002) (internal citations omitted). 
 27 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Depít of Justice, Civil Justice Statistics, at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/civil.htm (last revised Oct. 1, 2001). 
 28 Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 
1127 (1996). 
 29 Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further 
Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 15, 17-33 (1998) (reporting the results of nine empirical studies 
of punitive damages and concluding that the rate of punitive damages is low). 
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2. Show Me the Money: Punitive Damages Are Mostly 
Found in Intentional Tort Cases Filed By Businesses To 
Recoup Economic Loss 
 
Table Two 
Punitive Damages by Cybertort Type
N=49
10%
45%
6%
2%
29%
8%
Trespass to Chattels
Business Tort/Fraud
Other Intentional
Invasion of Privacy
Defamation
Non-Tort
 
The first decade of punitive damages in cyberspace shares 
common ground with eighteenth-century English law where the 
elite used the legal system to achieve greater power.30  Forty-five 
of the forty-nine punitive damages awards arose out of 
predominately cybertort cases, but every tort cause of action in 
the cyberlaw punitive damages sample arose out of an 
intentional tort.  Most punitive awards arose in business tort 
cases filed by online or bricks-and-mortar31 businesses.  
Cybertort punitive damages were predominately awarded in 
 
 30 Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American 
Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002) 
(describing Blackstoneís Commentaries on English Law as reflecting the values of 
property owners and wealthy elites) [hereinafter Rustad & Koenig, Taming the Tort 
Monster]. 
 31 A bricks-and-mortar business is an established company with a physical 
headquarters in the real space world as opposed to a purely online business with only a 
virtual presence. 
RUSTAD FINAL - MAY 28 5/28/2004 4:30 PM 
47 Punitive Damages in Cyberspace [Vol. 7:39 
economic loss cases rather than personal injury cases, which are 
the province of traditional tort law.  Punitive damages in 
Internet-related cases have not yet developed in cases based 
upon negligence or strict liability. 
The few cases where individuals obtained punitive damages 
often were in cases involving reputation or privacy injuries.32  In 
fact, online defamation cases alone accounted for 29% of all 
punitive damages awarded in cyberspace cases during the ten-
year period of the study.33  For example, a doctor defamed by an 
Internet posting charging him with taking kickbacks led to a 
punitive damages award.34  In another case, a University of 
North Dakota physics professor won a large punitive damages 
award against a former graduate student who accused him in 
online postings ìof being a pedophile and having odd sexual 
habits.î35  In a Florida case awarding punitive damages, an 
Internet web page contained numerous defamatory postings 
pertaining to the plaintiff and his children.36 
The most interesting aspect of Table Two is the cases that 
were not developed.  No consumer was awarded punitive 
damages in a products liability action for bad software, the 
transmittal of a virus, or a faulty Internet security product.  No 
consumer prevailed in a medical malpractice case arising out of 
telemedicine.37  Moreover, not a single punitive damages award 
was handed out in any substantive area of the law predicated 
upon either negligence or strict liability. 
Surprisingly, there were no personal injury lawsuits arising 
out of a decade of Internet sales or services.  Punitive damages in 
cyberspace cases were predicated upon intentional tort causes of 
action, generally in business disputes.  The business tort cases, 
 
 32 See infra Appendix A.  See also Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, No. 780187, 2001 
WL 1904203 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 2001) (assessing $350,000 in punitive damages for 
ìmore than 14,000 defamatory and sometimes vulgar messages on more than 100 Internet 
message boardsî accusing company executives of having illicit sexual relations and other 
bad acts). 
 33 See, e.g., Matos v. Am. Fedín of State, County & Mun. Employees, No. 
CV980578747, 2001 WL 1044632, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 2001) (reporting 
defamation claim by corrections department employee against union). 
 34 Graham v. Oppenheimer, JVR No. 382280, 2000 WL 33232110 (E.D. Va. Oct. 
2000) (awarding $350,000 in punitive damages). 
 35 Scott Carlson, North Dakota Professor Sues Former Student and a Web Site Over 
Allegations in an Article, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 19, 2001, at A33. 
 36 Bagwell v. Phillips, No. 97-13631, 1998 WL 1656174 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 23, 1998) 
(awarding $15,000 in punitive damages). 
 37 ìThe Institute of Medicine has defined telemedicine to encompass telephone, video 
and electronic transmission of medical information using telephone or digital technology.î  
Alissa R. Spielberg, Online Without a Net: Physician-Patient Communication by 
Electronic Mail, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 267, 287-88 (1999) (citing COMM. ON EVALUATING 
CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF TELEMEDICINE, INST. OF MED., TELEMEDICINE: A GUIDE TO 
ASSESSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN HEALTHCARE 16-17 (1996)). 
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which accounted for nearly half of the punitive damages awards 
(45%), included actions for the intentional interference with 
contract, unfair and deceptive trade practices, intentional 
interference with economic opportunities, intentional 
interference with noncommercial opportunities, unfair 
competition, fraudulent misrepresentation, and the 
misappropriation of trade secrets.  However, most of the 
Internet-related business tort cases involved large companies 
suing rivals or other companies interfering with their 
businesses.38 
A typical business tort case where punitive damages were 
awarded occurred when one dot-com company sued another dot-
com over a generic domain name.39  Punitive damages were also 
awarded in a wrongful discharge case against a former dot-com 
company.40  Bitter internecine business disputes between online 
companies and employees accounted for another large segment of 
cases.41 
The legally protected interest in the vast majority of 
cybertort awards was to protect intellectual property interests 
such as trademarks, domain names, or trade secrets.  A court 
levied a $65 million judgment against an online pornographer for 
pirating the sex.com domain name.42  The courtís award included 
$25 million in punitive damages to punish the defendantís 
fraudulent scheme perpetrated by a forged letter to a domain 
name registrar.43 
In Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast 
Entertainment Corp.,44 the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
 
 38 See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidderís Edge, Inc., 56 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1856 (N.D. Cal. 
2000) (involving rival Internet companies suing over alleged anticompetitive conduct, 
such as tortious interference with an advertising contract). 
 39 Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce: Move Over 
Inherently Distinctive Trademarks ñ The E-Brand, I-Brand and Generic Domain Names 
Ascending to Power?, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 937, 977 (2001) (describing a case where E-
cards.com was awarded $1 million in punitive damages in its unfair competition action 
against Ecards.com). 
 40 Moreau v. Direct Express, No. BC 222666, 2001 WL 761748, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 21, 2001). 
 41 See, e.g., Home Interactive Corporation Wins $11 Million Verdict, at 
http://www.marketwire.com/mw/release_html_b1?release_id=36285 (Dec. 21, 2001) 
(reporting that a jury ordered the former president of a software company to pay punitive 
damages for stealing company property, disabling the plaintiffís web site, emptying the 
companyís bank account, and generally interfering with the plaintiffís business after he 
resigned). 
 42 Laurie J. Flynn, Cybersquatting Draws Heavy Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2001, 
at C4. 
 43 Robyn Weisman, Sex.com Plaintiff to Get US $65 Million, at 
http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/8699.html (Apr. 4, 2001).  See Kremen v. Cohen, 325 
F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2003) (certifying question to the California Supreme Court). 
 44 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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courtís denial of an injunction prohibiting a competitorís use of its 
rivalís trademark in a domain name as well as in metatags on its 
web site.45  The dispute grew out of the defendantís use of 
metatags with its rivalís trademark to increase the traffic to 
another web site.  The court compared the misuse of metatags 
and the diversion of web traffic from the rightful trademark 
ownerís site to ìposting a sign with anotherís trademark in front 
of oneís store.î46  On remand, the District Court denied summary 
judgment for punitive damages, holding that there was a triable 
fact as to whether West Coast was aware of Brookfieldís rights at 
the time.47 
The dataset demonstrates that punitive damages have not 
yet evolved as a sanction to punish and deter unfair or deceptive 
practices against consumers in cyberspace.  Few plaintiffs found 
any legal remedy for violations of Internet security, data mining, 
or the invasion of privacy, although hardly a day passes when 
there is not a media account of some egregious breach of Internet 
privacy. 
 
 45 Id. at 1066-67. 
Metatags are HTML code intended to describe the contents of the web site.  
There are different types of metatags, but those of principal concern to us are 
the ìdescriptionî and ìkeywordî metatags.  The description metatags are 
intended to describe the web site; the keyword metatags, at least in theory, 
contain keywords relating to the contents of the web site. 
Id. at 1045. 
 46 Id. at 1064. 
 47 Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entmít Corp., No. CV 98-9074, 1999 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23251, at *25-26, 28 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 1999). 
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3. Punitive Damages Do Not Arise Out of Consumer 
Transactions 
Table Three 
Punitive Damages by Plaintiff Type
N=49
4%
16%
14%
12%
53%
Other Organization
Nat'l/Internat'l Co.
Medium Corporation
Small Corp/Website
Indiv idual
 
Many individual plaintiffs obtained punitive damages for 
aggravated misconduct growing out of the employment 
relationship.  Although individuals were the largest prevailing 
plaintiff category, these cases did not arise out of business-to-
consumer transactions.  For example, no consumer won an award 
against an Internet seller or renderer of services in a decade of 
cyberlaw cases.48  Rather, 100% of the punitive damages awarded 
to individuals in cyberlaw cases were non-consumer in nature.  It 
is remarkable that for a ten year period, in all U.S. federal and 
state courts, not a single consumer prevailed in a cyberlaw case 
in which punitive damages were awarded. 
Individuals were the plaintiffs in one of every two punitive 
damages verdicts in Internet tort cases.  However, punitive 
damages in cyberlaw cases played no meaningful role as a means 
of consumer protection for individuals.  In a decade of punitive 
 
 48 The plaintiff and defendant characteristic as well as the aggravating 
circumstances for each of the forty-nine cyberlaw cases were systematically coded.  See 
infra Appendix A. 
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damages awards, no case arose out of an online sale or service 
which could be classified as a consumer transaction.49  Punitive 
damages, for example, were not awarded for the failure of online 
merchants to deliver goods or defective software.  Furthermore, 
no consumer received punitive damages for non-consented 
transfers of their personal information. 
Punitive damages awarded in favor of individuals arose out 
of  non-consumer contexts such as the employment relationship 
or in disputes between individuals.  When punitive damages 
were awarded to individuals, it was often in the context of ugly 
disputes arising out of incendiary exchanges on listservs, web 
sites, or e-mails.  Nasty neighborhood disputes sometimes 
morphed into full-scale punitive damages warfare.  The category 
of cases awarding punitive damages to individuals involved 
online stalkers,50 vengeful neighbors,51 and sexual harassers.52  
For example, when a neighbor published derogatory statements 
on an Internet web page about a family, the target obtained 
punitive damages in a Florida court.53  In that case, the 
defendant also published photographs of the plaintiffís minor 
child as well as the childís name, address, and telephone number 
on the web site.54  The plaintiffís punitive damages award was 
based on the common law torts of trespass, slander, nuisance, 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.55 
Many of these non-consumer cases involved business torts 
where an individual filed suit against a company.  In one highly 
publicized case, two former research scientists employed by a 
high tech company published over 14,000 defamatory and vulgar 
messages on their web site and on over 100 Internet message 
boards.56  The postings targeted two current corporate executives, 
 
 49 The Magnuson-Moss WarrantyóFederal Trade Commission Improvement Act, for 
example, defines consumer products as meaning ìany tangible personal property which is 
distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or household 
purposes.î  15 U.S.C. ß 2301(1) (1998).  Consumers are defined in the online context as a 
plaintiff filing an action against a seller or provider of services for actions such as the 
invasion of privacy, release of defective software, failure to deliver merchandise or similar 
actions. 
 50 Tim Doulin, Jurors Order Stalker to Pay Victims for Internet Harassment, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Feb. 21, 2002, at C12 (awarding $105,000 to two female 
musicians who were stalked over the Internet). 
 51 Bagwell v. Phillips, No. 97-13631, 1998 WL 1656174 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 23, 1998). 
 52 See, e.g., Butler v. Krebs, No. 96-1204096, 1998 WL 2023763 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June 
8, 1998) (awarding punitive damages against a Continental Express pilot for 
superimposing plaintiffís photograph onto other female bodies and transmitting the 
images over the Internet). 
 53 Bagwell, 1998 WL 1656174. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, No. 780187, 2001 WL 1904203 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 17, 2001) (noting that plaintiffs alleged libel, invasion of privacy, breach of contract, 
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accusing them of ìhaving extramarital affairs, videotaping office 
bathrooms, chronically lying and hallucinating.î57  In another 
case, a urologist obtained punitive damages against a defendant 
pathologist and his affiliated medical corporation for anonymous 
postings on the Internet.58  Punitive damages were based upon 
the false accusation that the plaintiff was accepting kickbacks 
from a bidding company.59 
Many individual plaintiffs obtained punitive damages for 
aggravated wrongdoings growing out of the employment 
relationship.  In one bizarre case, a female employee received 
punitive damages when another employee and his son used the 
Internet to harrass her by exposing her to web sites devoted to 
sexual perversion.60  In another instance, Internet America and 
its executives were assessed $100,000 in punitive damages, with 
a total verdict of more than $6 million, in an Internet-related 
lawsuit for defrauding their former financial officer.61  The 
former Internet America executiveís contention was that the 
president of the company defrauded her by convincing her to sell 
off her stock at a mere $0.80 per share just prior to a successful 
Initial Public Offering (ìIPOî).62 
The second largest plaintiff category is national or 
international corporations (16%) followed by medium (14%) and 
small (12%) companies.  Court decisions have aided large 
stakeholders in expanding their identity and intellectual 
property rights in the new economy.  The typical business 
plaintiff is a ìrepeat playerî or a large corporation with 
substantial legal and financial resources, such as Playboy 
Enterprises and America Online (ìAOLî).63  According to the 
survey of cases, the largest stakeholders of the Internet economy 
 
and unfair business practices, and sought compensatory and punitive damages). 
 57 Id.  ìA Santa Clara County jury awarded $775,000 in compensatory and punitive 
damages to a business and two of its employees after finding two former employees had 
libeled the plaintiffs with defamatory and vulgar statements posted on the Internet.î  Id. 
 58 Graham v. Oppenheimer, No. 00-CV-57, 2000 WL 33381418, at *1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 
15, 2000). 
 59 Id.  See also Graham v. Oppenheimer, JVR No. 382280, 2000 WL 33232110 (E.D. 
Va. Oct. 2000). 
 60 Kelly v. Whitley County, No. 00-CV-388, 2002 WL 31932414 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 18, 
2002) (awarding $230,000 damages against jailor and county in case involving retaliatory 
discharge). 
 61 Carradine v. Internet Am. Inc., No. 05-01-01577-CV, 2001 WL 1825528 (Tex. Dist. 
Ct. Mar. 26, 2001), vacated, 106 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. App. 2003) (vacating due to settlement). 
 62 Id. 
 63 See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Natíl Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890 
(N.D. Iowa 2001) (awarding $100,000 punitive damages for willful and wanton actions); 
Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, No. 98-0011-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20448 (E.D. Va. Nov. 20, 
1998) (magistrateís report recommending award of punitive damages for bad faith 
actions), affíd No. 98-0011-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20645 (E.D. Va. Dec. 30, 1998).  See 
also cases cited infra notes 156, 157, 164. 
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were using punitive damages as a tool for consolidating their 
market share in the Internet economy.  Therefore, most cyberlaw 
cases in the business context feature large Internet companies 
suing newly-established companies or individuals. 
Cybersquatters64 were frequently sued by powerful Internet 
industry stakeholders for trademark infringement.65  John 
Zuccarini, a notorious cybersquatter, earned millions by 
registering domain names based upon the common misspellings 
of trademarks, a practice called ìtyposquatting.î66  For example, 
in one case, Zuccarini was ordered to pay damages and attorney 
fees based upon a finding that the defendantís use of domain 
names was ìconfusingly similar,î thereby constituting a violation 
of the federal Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act,67 
and an infringement of a famous trademark68  The court ordered 
greater damages because the defendant was a recidivist who had 
been enjoined from registering misspelled names in suits brought 
by other companies.69  In another case, America Online sought 
injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages 
against AT&T, a competing ISP, in a trademark infringement 
action because AT&T was using the terms ìBuddy List,î ìYou 
have Mail!,î and ìIM Here.î70 
While large corporations are often plaintiffs in these cases, 
they rarely find themselves on the defense side of cyberlaw 
lawsuits.  In cases where large corporations were named 
defendants, punitive damages were rarely awarded.71  Likewise, 
the government was a defendant in fewer than 2% of cyberlaw 
casesóprimarily Internet speech cases.  Again, punitive damages 
 
 64 Cybersquatting is ìthe practice of registering ëwell-known brand names as 
Internet domain namesí in order to force the rightful owners of the marks ëto pay for the 
right to engage in electronic commerce under their own brand name.íî  Virtual Works, Inc. 
v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting S. REP. NO. 106-
140, at 5 (1999)). 
 65 See, e.g., Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 479-81, 487 (3d Cir. 2001); Elecs. 
Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, 56 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1705 (E.D. Pa. 2000). 
 66 US Authorities, supra note 17. 
 67 15 U.S.C. ß 1125(d) (1998 & Supp. 2003); 113 Stat. 1501, 1537 (1999).  Congress 
enacted the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act to deter the increasing practice 
of cybersquatting.  Virtual Works, Inc., 238 F.3d at 267. 
 68 Elecs. Boutique Holdings Corp., 56 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1710-11. 
 69 Id. at 1713. 
 70 Am. Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 814, 823 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 71 See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (holding that Amazon.com was not entitled to injunctive relief because 
barnesandnoble.com had raised a substantial challenge to the validity of their ì1-clickî 
patent); GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2000) (reinstating 
preliminary injunction prohibiting Disney from using confusingly similar logo); 
PlayMedia Sys., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (enjoining 
America Online because its use of software exceeded the license agreement). 
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were rarely assessed.72  Rather, defendants such as spammers 
and online pornographers accounted for most of the punitive 
damages awards in business tort cases.73  In cyberspace, the 
ìrepeat playersî such as America Online and other large Fortune 
500 companies have the economic and legal resources needed to 
successfully litigate punitive damages lawsuits.74 
No straightforward enforcement mechanism exists for 
enforcing tort judgments against web site providers who have no 
physical presence within the United States.  Cyberspace 
judgments are only enforceable if the defendant has assets 
subject to legal process in the plaintiffís forum state.  American 
courts require the plaintiff to prove minimum contacts sufficient 
to satisfy due process over a nonresident defendant.75  Courts 
have declined jurisdiction in many Internet-related cases, ruling 
that a passive web site alone is an insufficient basis for 
jurisdiction.76  For a court to exercise jurisdiction, the defendant 
 
 72 See, e.g., PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 108 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2000); 
Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. 
Va. 1998). 
 73 See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Natíl Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890 
(N.D. Iowa 2001) (imposing punitive damages for sending spam e-mail on dental and 
optical plans); Mattel Inc. v. Internet Dimensions Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1620 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (enjoining pornographerís use of the phrase ìBarbieís play penî on its 
adult entertainment web site on the grounds that it diluted Mattelís trademark ìBarbieî 
for dolls); Hollywood Entmít Corp. v. Hollywood Entmít, Inc., No. C 98-3670, 1999 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 6466 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 1999) (entering default judgment in favor of family 
video rental store against pornographic video rental store using identical trademark); 
Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Internet Entmít Group, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (E.D. Mo. 
1999) (enjoining use of PapalVisit.com domain name by adult entertainment web site 
because it tarnished the Catholic Churchís trademark); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie 
Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (enjoining defendants from using its 
trade name and service marks in spam e-mail); Hasbro Inc. v. Internet Entmít Group, 
Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (enjoining pornographerís misuse of 
CANDYLAND trademark in domain name). 
 74 Marc Galanter, Why the ìHavesî Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOCíY REV. 95, 97-114 (1974). 
 75 A threshold issue in many Internet cases is whether an out of state defendant may 
be subject to process in the forum.  The inquiry frequently focuses on whether the 
defendantís web site activities are interactive or passive: 
The great majority of these cases have adopted the analytical framework of 
Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 
(W.D. Pa. 1997).  In Zippo ñ also a case of specific jurisdiction ñ the court 
examined the few cases that had previously addressed the issue of whether a 
Web site could provide sufficient contacts for specific personal jurisdiction.  It 
applied the results of these cases to the traditional personal jurisdiction 
analytical framework, noting that ìthe likelihood that personal jurisdiction can 
be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality 
of the commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.î 
Lakin v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 710 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district 
courtís finding that the plaintiff had not proven minimum contacts to satisfy due process, 
but reversing on the issue of general jurisdiction ordering additional discovery). 
 76 See generally MICHAEL RUSTAD & CYRUS DAFTARY, E-BUSINESS LEGAL HANDBOOK 
ß 7.03 (2003 ed.). 
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must have sufficient ìminimum contactsî such that they have 
ìpurposefully availedî themselves of the privilege of doing 
business in the forum.77  The issue of purposeful availment turns 
on factual circumstances such as whether the web site targeted 
residents in the plaintiffís jurisdiction.78 
4. Punitive Damages Are Awarded In Internet Economy 
Strongholds 
Table Four 
Jurisdiction for Punitive Damages Awards
                         1992-2002
                                    N=49
State of Trial
Conn
Colo
Wisconsin
California
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Texas
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Oregon
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MdKyIaIndIllGaFla
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Punitive damages in cyberspace between 1992-2002 were 
handed down in only a handful of states.  The state of California 
accounted for approximately one in three punitive damages 
awards (N=16, 33%).  Texas ranked second with 9 of the 49 
 
 77 See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water Publíg, 327 F.3d 472, 480-84 
(6th Cir. 2003) (reversing district courtís purposeful availment determination as to record 
company), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 399 (2003); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 
282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the purposeful availment requirement is 
satisfied ìif the website is interactive to a degree that reveals [that the defendant] 
specifically intended interaction with residents of the stateî); Biometics, LLC v. New 
Womyn, 112 F. Supp. 2d 869, 872-73 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (selling products on web site to state 
residents constituted purposeful availment). 
 78 The leading case in this area is Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 
which developed a continuum where the middle ground is the borderline between passive 
and active web sites.  952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
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punitive damages awards (18%) followed by Virginia with four 
(8%) and Georgia and Illinois with three each.  These five states 
were the only jurisdictions that handed down three or more 
punitive damages awards in Internet-related cases during that 
ten-year period.79  Seventy-one percent of punitive damages in 
cyberspace cases were awarded in these five jurisdictions (N=35).  
Only twelve other states had one or more punitive damages 
awards during a decade of Internet-related litigation in all 
federal and state courts.80 
Table Four documents that punitive damages coalesced in 
the epicenters of the Internet economy and were correlated with 
the location of key Internet companies.  Table Four also confirms 
that the cyber-jurisdictional hot spots roughly correspond to 
centers of the Internet economy.  A disproportionate number of 
punitive damages awards were made in states with powerful 
computer-based, entertainment or software industries.  Two 
information-age leaders, California and Texas, accounted for 
greater than half of the punitive damages awards handed down 
in the decade 1992-2002.  In many of these cases the plaintiff was 
a Texas or California corporation seeking redress against domain 
name entrepreneurs, cyberpirates, or online business 
competitors. 
The greater incidence of punitive damages may be partially 
explained by the prominence of these states in the information 
economy.  Californiaís robust pattern of litigation is due to the 
dominance of the entertainment, high technology, and software 
industries.  Similarly, Texas is rapidly becoming an epicenter of 
the computer software industry.  Another notable mention is the 
Northern District of Virginia, where a flurry of anti-spam cases 
filed by America Online accounts for almost all of Virginiaís 
punitive damages caseload in the decade studied.  As we shall 
see, the empirical evidence suggests that punitive damages 
served primarily as a corporate means of legal control to protect 
the information industries in these states from spammers, 
cyberpirates, infringers, and other Internet wrongdoers. 
 
 
 79 In the larger study of torts in cyberspace, seventy percent of the cybertorts were 
decided in only five states: California (33%, N=38), Illinois (4%, N=5), New York (6%, 
N=7), Texas (13%, N=15) and Virginia (13%, N=15).  See infra Appendix A. 
 80 Professor Saks, University of Iowa, concludes that no reliable data exists on 
plaintiff wins or even the size of awards over time in traditional tort litigation.  Michael J. 
Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System ñ 
And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1154 (1992). 
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5. Punitive Damages Act as a Form of Corporate Self-Help 
Table Five 
Industry of Prevailing Plaintiff
N=49
6%
14%
35%
45%
Other
Brick and Mortar
Information Industry
Individual
 
a. Corporate Dominance in Cyberspace 
Forty-nine percent of the cyberlaw punitive damages awards 
were assessed in favor of companies classifiable as either 
predominately a brick-and-mortar company or one in the 
information industry.81  A content analysis of the cases in these 
industries confirms that corporate America is a major beneficiary 
of the punitive damages sword.  Companies in all industries 
outnumber individual plaintiffs and many of the disputes involve 
powerful Internet stakeholders vindicating their rights in 
 
 81 The largest component of the ìinformation industryî is made up of ISPs, online 
service providers, and telecommunication providers, which together account for 15% of all 
cases.  Computer software companies, such as Microsoft, Adobe, Intel, and the larger ISPs 
were the big winners in cyberspace.  Internet-based companies with a bricks-and-mortar 
presence constituted the single largest plaintiff class among the non-individual plaintiffs.  
ISPs accounted for the next largest plaintiff category industry, followed by other online 
sales and services.  Miscellaneous organizations accounted for only two punitive damages 
awards.  The information industry plaintiffs included companies that predominately 
involved the transfer of intangible products such as software, entertainment content, and 
other intangibles.  ISPs such as America Online and Earthlink constituted one of the 
largest sectors of the information industry in the sample.  Other organizations included 
non-profits.  The research universe did not include governmental organizations as 
prevailing plaintiffs. 
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cyberspace.82  The individual plaintiffs depicted in Table Five 
prevailed in cases arising out of non-consumer claims.83  
Stockholders, investors, or employees received punitive damages 
in only three of the forty-nine (6%) Internet-related cases 
involving securities fraud or the failure to pay stock options.84  
The residual ìotherî category included a few nonprofit 
organizations.85  The next subsection examines the functions of  
punitive damages for corporate plaintiffs in business-to-business 
transactions. 
b. Corporate Self-Help Remedy in Cyberspace 
i. Protecting Trade Secrets in Cyberspace 
In the Internet economy, the crown jewels of a company may 
be confidential information such as source code or methods of 
doing business online.  Accordingly, companies have used 
punitive damages as a tool to redress the misappropriation of 
trade secrets.  Trade secrets on the Internet may be lost at the 
 
 82 See, e.g., EarthLink, Inc. v. Smith, 13 Internet L. & Reg. (P&F) 94, (N.D. Ga. July 
9, 2002) (awarding punitive damages against spammer in favor of large ISP); Am. Online, 
Inc. v. Natíl Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (awarding 
punitive damages to AOL); Schmerin v. CD Titles, Inc., No. SUCV95-07061, 1998 WL 
1754045 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 1998) (awarding punitive damages to business 
against small web site).  See also Nguyen, supra note 39, at 977 (noting the award of 
punitive damages in a business tort dispute over domain name between E-cards.com and 
ECards.com); Neon Systems Says It Won $39 Million Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2001, at 
C4 (punitive damages awarded in business torts case). 
 83 Non-consumer cases frequently arose out of the employment relationship.  See, 
e.g., Butler v. Krebs, No. 96-1204096, 1998 WL 2023763 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June 8, 1998) 
(awarding punitive damages against airline and co-workers for superimposing nude 
image of female pilot on web site and intranet among other acts of online harassment); 
Franza v. Hayes, No. 802402, 2001 WL 1137243 (Ga. Fulton County Ct. May, 2001) 
(awarding punitive damages to employee in workplace case). 
 84 There were a few Internet-related securities fraud cases in which punitive 
damages were awarded for new dot-com businesses that allegedly defrauded investors.  In 
one case, investors were awarded $250,000 in punitive damages when directors of an 
educational web site misrepresented that its stock would be registered and that the 
investors would receive stock in another web site company.  Chee v. PinkMonkey.com, 
Inc., No. 00-38766, 2002 WL 1919479 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June 11, 2002). 
 85 The research sample excludes actions by the Federal Trade Commission (ìFTCî), 
Securities & Exchange Commission, and other government agencies prosecuting actions 
against cyberspace defendants.  The sample includes cases where an individual or 
corporate entity files suits against a government agency as a wrongdoer.  Civil penalties 
filed by the FTC in cyberspace cases are increasing rapidly.  The cases in the FTC sample 
disproportionately included defendants advertising miracle health products, get rich 
business schemes, false credit repair schemes, deceptive investment opportunities, 
pyramid schemes, deceptive adult entertainment sites, spam e-mailers, and other 
marginal businesses.  In recent years, FTC enforcers are expanding their enforcement 
sweeps to include mainstream companies.  Gateway.net, for example, was fined for 
advertising free Internet services without the disclosure that long distance charges were 
not free.  The FTC is also expected to expand its enforcement against web sites 
surreptitiously collecting consumer personal information.  Gateway Settles FTC Charges 
Over Free Internet Service Claims, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/05/gateway.htm (May 
15, 2001). 
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click of the mouse and must be protected by measures to guard 
the secrecy of information transmitted.  Some of the first 
cyberlaw cases involved litigation to vindicate the 
misappropriation of trade secrets.  The first online trade secrets 
cases arose out of the Church of Scientologyís attempt to enjoin 
further distribution of church doctrine on web sites.86  In one 
case, the Church of Scientology filed suit against the Washington 
Post for publishing portions of Scientology doctrine entitled 
ìAdvanced Technology,î which were claimed as trade secrets.87  
The federal district court denied injunctive relief finding that the 
defendantsí actions were protected by the fair use doctrine of 
federal copyright law and that the disputed documents were no 
longer a trade secret as they had already been posted on the 
Internet.88 
Trade secrets in the online world deserve the same 
protections as in the bricks-and-mortar world.  Internet trade 
secrets are particularly vulnerable because the interconnected 
system of computers makes it possible for hackers, ex-employees, 
and experts in corporate espionage to steal information without 
leaving physical evidence.  The Internet economy is known for a 
rapid turnover in employees, and online companies face the 
constant danger that an ex-employee will misappropriate trade 
secrets for use in a competitorís business.  For example, 
Monster.com recently settled a trade secret lawsuit against its 
former president and eighteen ex-employees who left the 
company to join a rival Internet company.89 
The misappropriation of trade secrets is a popular cause of 
action to protect the intangible assets of companies connected to 
the Internet.90  In DoubleClick, Inc. v. Henderson,91 several 
employees of a prominent Internet advertising company planned 
to leave in order to form a dot-com startup.92  DoubleClick 
 
 86 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 
F. Supp. 1361, 1365-66 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (refusing to enjoin bulletin board service which 
posted church documents); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1369 (E.D. 
Va. 1995) (granting defendantís motion for summary judgment because there was no 
trade secret misappropriation ). 
 87 Lerma, 908 F. Supp. at 1364-65. 
 88 Id. at 1367-68.  See also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 
1519 (D. Colo. 1995) (denying preliminary injunction where balance of harms weighed 
against the plaintiff in case involving Church doctrine allegedly protected as trade 
secrets). 
 89 Monster.com Ends Suit on Ex-Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2001, at C7. 
 90 See, e.g., SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (enjoining use of 
plaintiffís domain name as trademark infringement and enjoining meta tagging of 
plaintiffís trademarks as unfair competition), affíd sub nom., Silva v. Karlson, 259 F.3d 
717 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 91 No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997). 
 92 Id. at *3. 
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confiscated one of the employeeís laptops and found information 
on the hard drive, including e-mails and future business plans 
that provided evidence suggesting the misappropriation of trade 
secrets.93 
Punitive damages are increasingly used as a corporate tool to 
punish and deter competitors that misappropriate trade 
secrets.94  The Uniform Trade Secrets Act95 (ìUTSAî) provides a 
wide array of remedies for trade secret misappropriation, 
including preliminary injunctive relief, monetary damages, lost 
profits, consequential damages, lost royalties, and attorneysí 
fees.96  Section 3 of UTSA also gives the court the power to award 
ìexemplary damages in an amount not exceeding twice any 
award.î97 
In October 2003, the Internet Truckstop, a web site devoted 
to improving efficiencies in freight services,98 received a $120,000 
punitive damages award against a competitor, Getloaded.com for 
the theft of trade secrets.99  The judge imposed punitive damages 
after the jury found Getloaded.com liable for hacking into 
Internet Truckstopís computer system and misappropriating 
computer codes and other trade secrets.100 
In yet another case, a California court imposed $2.25 million 
in punitive damages and $4.3 million in compensatory damages 
against a Seattle firm for misappropriating an Internet 
companyís technology for pop-up ads.101  The defendants, who 
were in the business of selling cameras, used the plaintiffís pop-
up technology to feature ìcameras trained on scantily clad 
women.î102  The plaintiffs charged the defendant with failing to 
pay online advertising revenues and with misappropriating client 
lists that were used to start the defendantís own company.103 
 
 93 Id. 
 94 See, e.g., Bob Mims, Overstock.com Sues Two Former Employees, SALT LAKE TRIB., 
Dec. 9, 2003, at E9 (reporting that an Internet closeout retailer filed a trade secret claim 
seeking punitive damages against former employees who allegedly sold customersí e-mail 
addresses to spammer). 
 95 THE NATíL CONFERENCE OF COMMíRS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF. TRADE SECRETS 
ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS ßß 3-4 (1985). 
 96 Id. at ß 3. 
 97 Id. 
 98 The services offered by the Internet Truckstop included freight matching and its 
corporate goal is to ìë[f]ill empty trailers.íî  John D. Schulz, Attacking Inefficiencies, 
TRAFFIC WORLD, Sept. 18, 2000, at 33 (quoting Internet Truckstop executive, Scott 
Moscrip). 
 99 Trucking Site Appeals $510K Verdict, $120K in Punitives in CFAA Case, 16 
SOFTWARE L. BULL. 3 (Oct. 2003). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Claire Luna, Court Victory for Firm Run by 3 Brothers, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003 
(Orange County ed.), at B3. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
RUSTAD FINAL - MAY 28 5/28/2004 4:30 PM 
61 Punitive Damages in Cyberspace [Vol. 7:39 
In general, large, established companies prevail in cybertort 
cases against smaller rivals, startups, or web sites.  Punitive 
damages have been imposed in questionable business torts cases 
where the evidence of aggravated circumstances was weak or 
non-existent.  The typical domain name dispute is a control 
struggle between an established trademark owner and an 
Internet entrepreneur who has registered a domain name 
containing the same trademark. 
ii. Punitive Damages and Domain Name Warfare 
Domain name disputes typically arise when the registrant, 
in an effort to attract Internet users, obtains the right to use a 
domain name that is substantially similar or identical to the 
trademarks or the name of a famous company or person.  The 
impact on the trademark ownerís business may be dramatic 
because of the confusion created by a misleading domain name 
address. 
In Kremen v. Cohen,104 ex-convict Stephen Cohen forged a 
letter to a domain name registrar, Network Solutions, claiming it 
was a letter he received from Online Classifieds.105  The forged 
letter tricked the registrar into assigning Kremenís rights to the 
domain name, sex.com, to Cohen.106  Cohenís letter ìclaimed the 
company had been ëforced to dismiss Mr. Kremen,í but ënever got 
around to changing our administrative contact with the internet 
registration [sic] and now our Board of directors has decided to 
abandon the domain name sex.com.íî107  Judge Alex Kozinski 
observed: 
Despite the letterís transparent claim that a company called 
ìOnline Classifiedsî had no Internet connection, Network 
Solutions made no effort to contact Kremen.  Instead, it 
accepted the letter at face value and transferred the domain 
name to Cohen.  When Kremen contacted Network Solutions 
some time later, he was told it was too late to undo the 
transfer.  Cohen went on to turn sex.com into a lucrative online 
porn empire.108 
Kremen filed a lawsuit against the perpetrator of the fraud 
as well as an action for conversion against the registrar for 
permitting the fraudulent transfer of sex.com.109  The district 
court concluded that the letter had been forged, and accordingly, 
 
 104 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 105 Id. at 1039. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 1027. 
 109 337 F.3d at 1027-28. 
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directed the defendant to return the domain name to Kremen.110  
The court also invoked the constructive trust doctrine as well as 
Californiaís unfair competition statute and ordered disgorgement 
of the defendantís profits.111  The evidence was undisputed that 
Cohen had forged the letter, whereby the owner, Kremen, 
through his housemate, purportedly transferred the ìsex.comî 
domain name.112  The district court, however, ruled that the 
registrar was not liable since domain names could not be 
converted.113  The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Network 
Solutions could be held liable for conversion in transferring 
Kremenís domain name to a con artist since Californiaís law of 
conversion covers the theft of intangibles.114  However, the 
defendant fled to Mexico, thumbing his nose at the court by 
secreting his assets in offshore locations beyond the reach of 
process.115 
In Simon Property Group, L.P. v. mySimon, Inc.,116 Simon 
Property Group (ìSPGî), a bricks-and-mortar company that 
designed and managed shopping malls, brought suit against 
mySimon, a dot-com company that had launched a web site in 
October 1998.117  Six months after mySimonís launch, SPG 
started ìa corporate ëbrandingí campaign to inform consumers 
that it owned and managed certain shopping malls,î although it 
had never considered such a campaign necessary in its 40 years 
of existence.118  ìSPG demanded that mySimon stop using the 
ëmySimoní name,î but the dot-com refused.119  SPG filed a 
trademark infringement lawsuit under the Lanham Act as well 
as business tort claims under Indiana state law.120 
The gravamen of SPGís claim was that it had exclusive 
rights to the ìSimonî name, and therefore, ìthat mySimonís 
name, Web address, and cartoon mascot named ëSimoní infringed 
on its rights.î121  The appeals court noted that SPG presented 
weak evidence that the ìëSimoní name had attained secondary 
 
 110 Id. at 1027. 
 111 Id.  The lower court ìawarded $40 million in compensatory damages and another 
$25 million in punitive damagesî under Californiaís unfair competition statute.  Id. 
 112 Kremen v. Cohen, No. C 98-20718, 2000 WL 1811403, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 
2000). 
 113 337 F.3d at 1036 (affirming dismissal of plaintiffís conversion claim against 
domain name registrar). 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 1027 (ìThe district court froze Cohenís assets, but Cohen ignored the order 
and wired large sums of money to offshore accounts.î).  
 116 282 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 117 Id. at 987-88. 
 118 Id. at 988. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Simon Prop. Group, 282 F.3d at 988. 
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meaning or that consumers were likely to confuse SPG with 
mySimon.î122  MySimon presented a highly probative consumer 
survey ìdemonstrating that there was no likelihood of confusion 
between mySimon and SPG.î123  Despite this compelling defense 
to SPGís claim of trademark infringement, the jury handed down 
an $11.5 million compensatory damages award against mySimon, 
even though the record showed that mySimon had not yet earned 
profits.124  The jury also awarded $5.3 million for corrective 
advertising and $10 million in punitive damages.125  Finally, the 
court permanently enjoined mySimon from using or 
incorporating the terms ìSimonî or ìmy Simonî in any Internet 
site and from using its ìSimonî cartoon mascot on its web site.126 
However, the trial judge ìfound that requiring mySimon to 
change its name provided sufficient relief,î and therefore, 
reversed the $11.5 million damages award.127  The judge also 
reduced the $10 million punitive damages award to $50,000 as 
required by Indianaís tort reform statute.128  Finally, the judge 
ìordered a new trial on the corrective advertising issue, subject to 
SPGís acceptance of a remittitur to nominal damages of $10.î129  
The Seventh Circuit dismissed SPGís appeal on the grounds that 
the company had ìvoluntarily abandoned its quest for a 
preliminary injunction after the district court denied its TRO 
motion,î and because ì[t]he potential threat to SPGís name [was] 
questionable.î130  In this case, the court apparently found that 
the corporate plaintiff was ìpushing the envelopeî in using 
punitive damages to protect its rights and defend its market 
position. 
iii. Protecting Corporate Reputations in 
Cyberspace 
Bitter disputes arise over the use of the Internet to impugn 
the reputation of companies by posting allegedly false 
information.  In Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,131 Amway 
brought suit against Procter & Gamble (ìP & Gî) after a third 
party published on the Internet a complaint P&G had filed in 
another case.  P & Gís posted complaint contained allegedly 
defamatory statements about Amway, its officers, and its 
 
 122 Id. at 988, 991. 
 123 Id. at 989. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Simon Prop. Group, 282 F.3d at 989. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 989-90. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 990-91. 
 131 346 F.3d 180 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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business practices, asserting that Amway was operating as an 
illegal pyramid scheme.132  The district court granted P & Gís 
motion for summary judgment and found that Michiganís 
Reporting Privilege protected the accurate posting of the publicly 
available court documents.133  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal, finding that even if the statements in the original 
document were defamatory, their publication on the Internet did 
not constitute an additional act of libel on P & Gís part.134  
Disputes between business competitors over Internet activities 
may amount to legal warfare.  The Sixth Circuit observed that 
the ìhate-filled history between P & G and Amway would take a 
writing as long as both the Old and New Testaments and involve 
at least one of the Good Bookís more prominent players.î135 
The Internet makes it easy to falsify return e-mail addresses, 
allowing web site posters to defame corporate actors 
anonymously.136  The corporate plaintiffs are sometimes forced to 
subpoena ISPs in order to discover the identity of these John Doe 
defendants.137  The use of John Doe subpoenas to unveil Internet 
corporate critics creates a conflict between tort law and the rights 
of free speech. 
A California company and two of its executives filed a libel 
and invasion of privacy-based lawsuit against two ex-employees 
who posted a series of messages on an Internet bulletin board 
devoted to the companyís publicly traded stock.138  The offending 
ìmessages maligned the companyís products and suggested that 
the two executives were incompetent and dishonest and that one 
of them, a woman, might have obtained her position by having 
sex with a supervisor.î139  A California jury found the ex-
employees liable for invasion of privacy, libel, breach of contract, 
and conspiracy, and awarded $425,000 in general damages and 
 
 132 Id. at 181. 
 133 Id. at 187. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 182 (internal footnote omitted). 
 136 Trade libel is similar to an ordinary defamation case in that a defendant has 
published a false and derogatory statement about a company.  Vondran v. McLinn, No. C 
95-20296, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21974, at *14 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 1995).  The test for 
business defamation is ìëwhether, in the circumstances, the writing discredits the plaintiff 
in the minds of any considerable and respectable class of the community.íî  Smith v. 
Suburban Rests., Inc., 373 N.E.2d 215, 217 (Mass. 1978) (quoting Muchnick v. Post Publíg 
Co., 125 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Mass. 1955)). 
 137 See Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001) 
(involving a corporation seeking to force America Online to reveal the identities of 
anonymous web posters). 
 138 Varian Wins $775,000 Jury Verdict in Internet Libel Case, at http://www.orrick.
com/news_events/releases.asp?action=article&articleID=56 (Dec. 18, 2001). 
 139 David Watson, C.A.: Defamatory Internet Posting Libel, Not Slander, 
METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE (Los Angeles), Nov. 14, 2003, at 1. 
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$350,000 in punitive damages.140  The trial judge enjoined the 
defendants from posting additional defamatory information.141  It 
is becoming clear that corporations are using punitive damages 
as a form of self-help to protect their intellectual property and 
intangible assets, and to punish trade libel. 
6. Punitive Damages Are Assessed Against Corporate Mice 
Not Elephants 
Table Six 
Punitive Damages by Defendant Type
N=49
6%
16%
10%
47%
20%
Other Organization
Nat'l/Internat'l Co.
Medium Corporation
Small Corp/Website
Indiv idual
 
a. Small Companies Comprise the Largest Category of 
Cybertort Defendants 
Table Six suggests that small companies are more likely to 
be defendants in cyberspace tort cases than large or medium 
corporations.142  A total of 47% (N=23) of the punitive damages 
 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Punitive damages were rarely awarded in favor of small companies against large 
companies.  Of the awards handed down against large corporate defendants, individuals 
won five of these cases.  Two of three were won by a medium sized company and only one 
punitive damages award was in favor of a small company against a large company.  In 
contrast, seven out of eight punitive damages awards won by large companies (defined as 
companies with a Fortune 500 presence or nationally known brand) were awarded against 
small corporate web sites or startup companies. 
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defendants were either small online companies or web sites.  
Medium-sized companies were defendants in only five cyberlaw 
cases in which punitive damages were awarded.  Of the five 
cases, three awards were in favor of employees of that 
corporation. Of the remaining two awards assessed against 
medium-sized companies, one award was to another medium-
sized company and the other to a national company.  No small 
company prevailed against a medium-sized company in a decade 
of cyberlaw cases.  The pattern suggests that small online 
companies are frequently targeted in punitive damages litigation.  
Still, the overall numbers of punitive damages awards are low.  It 
is suprising that there would be less than fifty successful 
punitive damages claims in a decade of Internet boom. It is quite 
likely that there may be additional barriers to litigating in 
cyberspace.  Even powerful corporate actors such as America 
Online or Microsoft may find it difficult to pursue elusive 
defendants in cyberspace.  The cases that did not result in 
punitive damages or that were never even brought because of 
barriers to litigating in cyberspace are the really interesting 
aspects implied by Table Six. 
The Internet allows anonymous communications that are 
virtually impossible to trace through Internet nodes.  Cyber-
tortfeasors frequently use false e-mail headers and anonymous 
remailers to make it difficult to retrace the steps of wrongdoing.  
Computer records are easy to alter and it is likely that spoliation 
of electronic evidence is widespread.  Internet fraud is frequently 
launched from an offshore haven.  For instance, the large 
numbers of Nigerian bank fraud schemes are hard to control 
because the perpetuators are located in West Africa.143 
b. Punitive Justice Against Infringing Mice 
The metaphor of Internet ìelephantsî and ìmiceî developed 
by Peter Swire is helpful in understanding the large number of 
cyberlaw wrongdoers who escape punitive justice.144  Professor 
 
 143 Lagos and Lome-Togo, Nigeria are the places of origin for most Nigerian Letter 
Scams.  Nigerian Letter Scams, Internet Fraud Complaint Center, at http://www.ifccfbi.
gov/strategy/nls.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).  Congo-Zaire, Sadton, Cote d Ivoire, Accra 
Ghana, Eleme, Festac Town, Ivory Coast, and Sierra-Leone are other African cities where 
these scams have developed.  Id.  Interestingly, ìCanada and the United Kingdom have 
[also] been identified as originating countries for this scam.î  Id.  Given these diverse 
locations, it will be expensive to obtain redress for the loss of funds, even if the ìdot 
consterî is identified. 
 144 Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: International Choice of Law and 
the Internet, 32 INTíL LAW 991, 993, 1019-23 (1998) (arguing that large multi-national 
corporations are elephants easy to regulate on the Internet because they frequently have 
assets that can be attached, versus ìmice,î who are small, mobile actors that can easily 
elude enforcement because they have the capacity to disappear or hide in an off-shore 
haven). 
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Swire defines corporate ìelephantsî as ìlarge organizations that 
have major operations in a country.  Elephants are powerful and 
have a thick skin, but are impossible to hide.  They are 
undoubtedly subject to a countryís jurisdiction.î145  In other 
words, when a corporate elephant such as a national corporation 
commits wrongs in cyberspace, there will frequently be assets to 
attach and officers to receive process.  For example, companies 
like AOL, Amazon.com, eBay, and Yahoo! are classified as 
ìelephantsî because they are subject to regulation everywhere.  
On the other hand, ìmiceî are the exact opposite.146 
Even when a prevailing plaintiff wins a large punitive 
damages award, collecting it is a different matter.  Collecting a 
punitive damages award is difficult because a number of wily 
Internet mice either fail to make an appearance, file bankruptcy, 
or simply disappear after the plaintiff obtains a judgment.147  
Default judgments outnumbered cases decided by juries in the 
larger cybertort dataset.  The plaintiffs in cases against Internet 
mice have almost no chance of collecting their judgment.148  In 
John Does v. Franco Productions,149 forty-six young men were 
awarded $506 million against Franco Productions and Internet 
Distributors for compensatory and punitive damages in a case in 
which the defendants secretly filmed college athletes and sold the 
videotapes on the Internet.150  The defendants secretly 
videotaped college athletes in locker rooms, restrooms, and 
showers.151  The tapes carried names like ìStraight Off the Matî 
and ìVoyeur Time,î and depicted hundreds of young athletes who 
had unknowingly been photographed in various degrees of 
nudity.152  However, since the primary defendant was likely 
offshore, and thus failed to make an appearance to defend the 
action, this multi-million dollar award is largely symbolic. 
 
 145 Id. at 993. 
 146 Id. 
 147 See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 656 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that online 
pornographer defaulted in a case filed by college athletes for secret filming and sale of 
videos online); Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003) (reporting that 
primary defendant moved assets to an off-shore haven and defaulted); Caton v. Trudeau, 
157 F.3d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1998) (reporting that defendant filed bankruptcy after 
Internet libel judgment was rendered). 
 148 See, e.g., GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 656-57 (observing that there was little chance in 
recovering $500 million award against defaulting primary defendant in decision 
dismissing claim against GTE for enabling sale of unauthorized tapes by defendant). 
 149 No. 99 C 7885, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24032 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2002), affíd sub 
nom., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 150 Id. at *1; Does v. Franco Prods., No. 99 C 7885, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9848, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. July 12, 2000). 
 151 Franco Prods., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *2. 
 152 Jere Longman, Videotaped Athletes Victorious in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002, 
at D8. 
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An Internet company ìcan reopen immediately after being 
kicked off of a server or can move offshore.î153  As Professor Swire 
notes, ìMice breed annoyingly quicklyónew sites can open at 
any time.î154  When ìharm over the Internet is caused by mice, 
hidden in crannies in the network, traditional legal enforcement 
is more difficult.î155  The large number of default judgments in 
cyberlaw reflects the reality that it is easy for web sites to 
disappear or assets to be transferred.  The next subsection 
illustrates how large corporate actors (ìelephantsî) are in a 
better position to litigate against elusive web site wrongdoers 
(ìmiceî) than are consumers. 
In the cyberlaw sample, corporate elephants were seldom 
defendants in punitive damages litigation.  From the beginning 
of cyberlitigation, it has been the large corporate elephants that 
have prevailed in lawsuits against mice.  In the field of 
intellectual property law, it is the owners of famous trademarks 
and trade names who frequently file lawsuits against small 
companies.  Playboy Enterprises, for example, has the legal 
resources to file intellectual property lawsuits to protect its 
trademarks and copyrighted images in cyberspace.156  Internet 
elephants frequently enjoy advantages as repeat players in 
cyberlitigation.  In many cases, only the corporate elephants have 
the legal resources to vindicate their rights.  Again, Playboy 
Enterprises is a good example of a major cyberlitigator who 
frequently files lawsuits to protect its corporate name and 
intellectual property rights.  Frequently, the corporate elephant 
is litigating against smaller companies, some of which are located 
in foreign venues.157 
 
 153 Swire, supra note 144, at 993. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 
1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (denying Playboyís motion for a preliminary injunction against 
Netscape for using Playboyís Internet-related trademarks in keywords of search engine), 
affíd, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Universal Tel-A-Talk, Inc., 48 
U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1779 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that plaintiff failed to allege necessary 
facts for a trademark counterfeiting claim). 
 157 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting 
Playboyís arguments that former playmate who used the phrase ìPlaymate of the Yearî 
on her web site and in metatags violated trademark law); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. 
Sanfilippo, 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1350 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (awarding damages to Playboy 
based upon the web siteís unauthorized copying of Playboyís copyrighted images); Playboy 
Enters., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Intíl, Inc., No. 97-734-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359 (E.D. Va. 
Feb. 2, 1998) (reporting copyright infringement action versus small foreign company); 
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (awarding 
damages to Playboy based upon the web siteís unauthorized copying of Playboyís 
copyrighted images), affíd, 168 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 1999); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ 
Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (finding bulletin board liable for 
direct and contributory infringement for posting Playboyís copyrighted and trademarked 
images for access by paying subscribers); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 
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The overall problem that there are too few punitive damages 
awards in cyberspace appears to be due to the huge costs 
involved in tracking down anonymous wrongdoers.  It is likely 
that few consumers have the technical expertise to determine 
who is tracking their click-streams, unleashing viruses, or 
sending fraudulent offers.  The small number of punitive 
damages cases may be partially explained by the fact that 
defendants may be mice who are difficult to trace.  In traditional 
torts, it is generally not a problem to determine the identity of a 
wrongdoer.  In contrast, cyber-tortfeasors are not physically 
present at the scene of the misdeed.  Computers can be the target 
of a tortious act, such as when information is misappropriated 
from a database or a computer network.  Furthermore, a network 
or web site may be the target of viruses or vandalism that 
constitutes a property tort. 
Owners of famous trademarks such as Playboy, Mattel, 
Victoriaís Secret, and America Online have been successful 
litigants in cyberspace because of their superior legal resources.  
These companies have used the courts to not only vindicate their 
traditional rights against Internet mice but also to expand 
intellectual property protections in this new medium.158  In many 
cases, large national enterprises were filing lawsuits against 
companies that existed only in cyberspace.  In Playboy 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc.,159 for example, a web site 
was found liable for copyright infringement for offering a 
subscription service to adult images protected by copyright.160 
Mice, on the other hand, have far more flexibility and can 
disappear at the click of a mouse or seek an offshore haven.  The 
anonymity of individual Internet users makes it easy to commit 
civil wrongs without consequence.  Enforcement by individuals is 
frustrated by the ease with which individual users may simply 
disappear from cyberspace.  Individuals subject to various 
cyberspace laws or controls may simply ìëexití from the regime 
defined by those laws.î161 
 
1552, (M.D. Fla. 1993) (finding that a small companyís web site infringed Playboyís 
trademarks and copyrights in posting images to its site). 
 158 The typical complaint by a trademark owner against the owner of a domain name 
is litigated under diverse causes of action, including (1) trademark infringement, (2) 
trademark dilution (federal and state), (3) domain name piracy, (4) false designation of 
origin, and (5) unfair competition.  Trademark owners frequently seek injunctive relief to 
enjoin the use of the domain name or a transfer of the domain name.  Courts may enjoin 
commercial content on a domain nameís web sites but are reluctant to enjoin the use of 
the domain name for noncommercial purposes. 
 159 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997), affíd, 168 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 160 Id. at 548. 
 161 Elizabeth Longworth, The Possibilities for a Legal Framework for Cyberspace, in 
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF CYBERSPACE LAW 16 (UNESCO Publíg 2000). 
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An Italian designer, Alfredo Versace, for example, was 
enjoined from marketing clothing and other items in the United 
States because the federal court ruled that he was using 
trademarks confusingly similar to trademarks registered by the 
famous designer, Gianni Versace.162  Undeterred by the federal 
court order, Alfredo simply used offshore Internet sites to 
advertise and distribute his products in the United States.163    
c. Anti-Spam Initiatives Against Online Mice 
Punitive damages lawsuits against commercial e-mailers 
accounted for approximately 10% of all awards.  In every 
punitive damages award, it was the ISP, rather than the 
consumer, who won punitive damages, even though the injuries 
were suffered primarily by consumers through spam e-mail.  For 
example, an unsolicited bulk e-mail health solicitation was sent 
to millions of AOL subscribers stating: ìThe answer to cancer has 
been know [sic] for years.  This website proves that eating 
inexpensive apple seeds and/or apricot seeds completely cure [sic] 
most cancers.  The theory also states that by eating just a few 
seeds per day will [sic] 99.95% guarantee that you will never 
develop cancer.î164  The commercial e-mail messages made claims 
regarding their ìcancer curesî and typically directed recipients to 
a web site where they could purchase products such as Laetrile, a 
videotape, and a book promoting the defendantís cancer 
treatment.165 
In the vast majority of the cases, it is the ISP rather than the 
consumer who seeks punitive damages and other relief against 
the spammer.  AOL, for example, ìhas undertaken various 
technical efforts to permit its members to opt out of receiving 
messages from domains and IP addresses that are or have been 
the subject of member complaints regarding unsolicited bulk e-
mail.î166  However, the wily spammer continually develops new 
methods for bypassing ISP controls.  The spammer transmits e-
mail ìfrom multiple and varying domains, employ[s] random and 
varying user names, relay[s] their messages through the servers 
of innocent third parties, or falsif[ies] the headers on their e-
mails to indicate that their messages are from domains that AOL 
 
 162 Gianni Versace, S.p.A. v. Versace, No. 01 Civ. 9645, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14858, 
at *47-48 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2003). 
 163 Id. at *15-16. 
 164 Am. Online, Inc. v. Christian Bros., No. 98 CIV 8959, slip op. at 9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 
1999) (quoting example of defendantís bulk e-mailing practices), available at 
http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dljunk/christian.html. 
 165 Id. at 10. 
 166 Id. at 11. 
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does not filter (e.g., ëmsn.comí or ëaol.comí).î167  Despite the best 
efforts of the ISP community, computer systems are unable to 
detect and filter much of the tidal wave of unsolicited bulk e-mail 
targeting consumers. 
This tidal wave of spam has greatly increased the costs 
associated with running an ISP.  For example, a director of one 
ISP claimed ìthat [spam] [had] added 500 percent to 700 percent 
to the ISPís costs over nearly three years.î168  Punitive damages 
are increasingly being used by large ISPs in punishing and 
deterring the widespread social problem of spam e-mail.  
Amazon.com, for example, has recently filed lawsuits seeking 
punitive damages against eleven e-mail marketers who spoofed 
the companyís e-mail addresses.169  The e-mail forgeries were 
ìpromoting, among other things, home appliances and penis 
enlargement.î170 
In one case, a California software manufacturer was sued for 
deceptive business practices in a Washington class action.171  The 
software vendor used deceptive Internet advertising banners that 
impersonated computer error messages with ìheadings that read 
ësecurity alert,í ëwarningí and ëmessage alert,í with messages that 
include[d]: íyou[r] computer is currently broadcasting an Internet 
IP address.  With this address, someone can immediately begin 
attacking your computer.íî172  Internet users receiving this 
message were urged to click ìOKî to the message.173  Allegedly, 
ìviewers who click an ëOKí button [were] forwarded to a 
commercial Web site promoting Bonzi software for preventing 
Internet intrusions or speeding up Internet connections.î174  The 
lawsuit, filed on behalf of consumers in eight states, was settled 
when the company agreed to label its ìsecurity alertî as an 
advertisement.175 
In a typical day, the average consumer has an e-mail inbox 
full of offers to make fast money.  ISPs such as America Online 
seek to enjoin these unsolicited advertisements to their millions 
 
 167 Id. 
 168 Drew Clark, E-Commerce: Internet Firms Share Horror Stories About Costs of 
Spam, NATíL J. TECH. DAILY, May 1, 2003, at LEXIS, Nexis Library NATíL J. TECH. DAILY 
File. 
 169 Matthew Heller, Lost in the Cyber-Kudzu, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003 (Magazine), 
at 24. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Software Manufacturer Accused of Using Deceptive Internet Ad Banners, MEALEYíS 
LITIG. REP.: CLASS ACTIONS,  Dec. 19, 2002, at 4. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Error Copycat Pop-up Will Be Labeled as Ad, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), May 29, 
2003, at 6E. 
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of subscribers by arguing that these unwanted messages trespass 
upon their personal property.  Consequently, ISPs such as 
America Online were the first to employ punitive damages as an 
anti-spam remedy.176  A large service provider such as AOL 
suffers damages due to spammersí use of false return addresses.  
In responding to subscriber complaints regarding spam e-mail, 
AOL incurs costs in wasted bandwidth, traffic slowdowns, decline 
in user productivity, and time.177 
America Online employs punitive damages to punish those 
who flood their subscribers with unwanted e-mail.  In America 
Online, Inc. v. National Health Care Discount, Inc.,178 the court 
found that the spammerís e-mail actions constituted a trespass to 
chattels as well as a violation of state and federal computer 
abuse laws.179  The court calculated damages by charging the 
spammer $2.50 per thousand pieces of spam for a total of 
$337,500.180 
In yet another case, America Online, Inc. v. Prime Data 
Systems, Inc.,181 the court entered a default judgment granting a 
permanent injunction and awarding compensatory and punitive 
damages.182  The court found that the mass e-mailerís conduct 
warranted the ìimposition of punitive damages both to punish 
defendantsí conduct and to deter othersí tortious behavior that 
threatens the vitality of Internet e-mail communication.î183  The 
magistrate judge set the level of punitive damages at ìthree 
times AOLís proven per-message cost of $.00078.î184  Thus, 
punitive damages were assessed at a rate of $.00234 per 
message.185  The court found that the punitive damages assessed 
were consistent with treble damages authorized by state and 
federal statutes for aggravated misconduct.186  However, the 
Prime Data court was forced to reduce the punitive damages 
award due to a 1988 tort reform statute that required judges to 
reduce awards to the upper limit of $350,000.187 
 
 
 176 See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 549 (E.D. Va. 1998) 
(awarding punitive damages against a spam e-mailer). 
 177 Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, No. 98-0011-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20448, at *3 (E.D. 
Va. Nov. 20, 1998).  
 178 174 F. Supp. 2d 890 (N.D. Iowa 2001). 
 179 Id. at 900. 
 180 Id. at 901. 
 181 No. 97-1652-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20226 (E.D. Va. Nov. 20, 1998). 
 182 Id. at *14-16. 
 183 Id. at *10. 
 184 Id. at *13. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Prime Data Systems, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20226, at *13-14. 
 187 Id. at *11 (citing VA. CODE ß 8.01-38.1). 
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Fraudulent uses of unsolicited commercial e-mail victimize 
millions of Internet users.  Accordingly, ISPs have filed hundreds 
of lawsuits seeking punitive damages to punish spammers, but 
tort law is just beginning to accomplish this goal.  Even a 
corporate elephant such as America Online must muster 
substantial resources to successfully litigate against elusive 
spam e-mailers who engage in such deceptive practices as 
falsified or redirected addresses. 
Despite the havoc that spam creates for Internet consumers, 
no individual plaintiff has ever won a victory against a spammer 
outside of small claims court judgments.  A Pennsylvania court 
expressly ruled that the federal Telephone Consumer Protection 
Act188 could not be used by consumers to punish and deter the 
sending of solicited commercial e-mail.189 
The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003190 that went into effect on 
January 1, 2004 prohibits consumers and ISPs from filing 
lawsuits against spam e-mailers under the federal statute.191  
Section 7 of the CAN-SPAM Act provides for exclusive 
enforcement by the FTC and certain other agencies, rather than 
by ISPs or consumers.192  State attorneys general are not 
permitted to file anti-spam lawsuits if there is a pending federal 
civil or administrative enforcement action by the FTC.193  
Furthermore, the new federal anti-spam statute preempts all 
state anti-spam legislation, even those that provide consumers 
with a cause of action against commercial e-mailers.194  A number 
of states enacted anti-spam statutes that permitted consumers to 
sue e-mail senders who used misleading subject lines, 
transmission paths, or third-party domain names without 
permission.195  In 2001 alone, anti-spam statutes were introduced 
in twenty-six states, and each of these statutes is preempted by 
CAN-SPAM.196  The nationalization of anti-spam legislation 
further marginalizes the role of consumers in directly redressing 
abuses due to unsolicited e-mail.  In the end, commercial e-
 
 188 47 U.S.C. ß 227 (2003). 
 189 Aronson v. Bright-Teeth Now, LLC, 824 A.2d 320, 320-21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). 
 190 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 
(CAN-SPAM Act of 2003), Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.). 
 191 See CAN-SPAM Act ß 7. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. ß 8.  Section 8 supersedes any state statute or regulation governing commercial 
e-mail, but it does not address the use of tort remedies against spam.  Id. 
 195 See, e.g., State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 407, 413 (Wash. 2001) (upholding state of 
Washington anti-spam statute and rejecting defendantís argument that it unduly 
burdened interstate commerce). 
 196 RUSTAD & DAFTARY, supra note 76, at ß 5.03[E]. 
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mailers will no longer be subject to consumer lawsuits under 
state anti-spam statutes. 
7. Punitive Damages Are Low-Ratio Awards Often Lower 
Than Compensatory Damages 
Table Seven 
Ratios of Punitive Damages in Cyberspace
N=49
12%
35%
53%
PDs More 3X CDs
PDs 1 to 3 Times CDs
PDs less than CDs
 
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Campbell,197 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a $145 million 
punitive damages award on the grounds of substantive due 
process.198  The Court observed that ì[c]ompensatory damages 
ëare intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has 
suffered by reason of the defendantís wrongful conductíî whereas 
ìpunitive damages . . . are aimed at deterrence and 
retribution.î199  The Courtís constitutional analysis of punitive 
damages requires the plaintiff to make a showing that the 
defendantís misconduct is sufficiently reprehensible in order to 
satisfy due process.200  The Courtís recent revisit of damage award 
 
 197 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003). 
 198 Id. at 1519-21. 
 199 Id. at 1519 (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 
424, 432 (2001)). 
 200 Id. at 1521.  The Court has also noted that reprehensibility is higher where the 
ìtarget of the conduct had financial vulnerability.î  Id. 
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ratios in Campbell should have little effect on cyberlaw punitive 
awards.  The Court held that a juryís award of punitive damages 
of $145 million and compensatory damages of $1 million (145:1) 
was unconstitutionally excessive.201  The Court came close to 
stating a per se rule that extreme ratios are presumptively 
unconstitutionally excessive.202  Punitive damages in cyberspace 
are often much smaller in proportion to the compensatory 
damages.  In 53% of the cyberlaw awards, the punitive 
component of the verdict was actually less than the 
compensatory damages.  In only six instances (12%) were 
punitive damages three or more times greater than the 
compensatory award. 
Table Seven confirms that there is no problem with 
skyrocketing punitive damages in cyberspace.  The function of 
punitive damages in the first decade of Internet litigation was 
generally to assist companies in protecting their rights and 
consolidating control of the Internet.  The traditional role of 
punitive damages in products liability, premises liability, medical 
malpractice, and other substantive fields is to provide consumer 
protection.  In cyberspace, consumers were conspicuously missing 
from the punitive damages equation.  Courts have been reluctant 
to impose legal duties on corporate defendants for inadequate 
Internet security and for preventing third parties from 
unleashing viruses, hacking, or stealing consumer information.  
Furthermore, courts have yet to extend products liability 
standards to computer software or web sites. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 201 Id. at 1524. 
 202 Id. 
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8. Punitive Damages Were Rarely Appealed By Defendant 
Table Eight 
Judicial Review of Punitive Verdicts
N=49
76%
12%
8%
4%
No Adjustment
App. Court Modifies
Trial Ct. Modifies
Appeal Upheld
 
Table Eight reveals that relatively few judicial adjustments 
were made to punitive damages in cyberspace cases.  No appeal 
or post-verdict adjustment occurred in thirty-seven of the forty-
nine cyberlaw punitive damages awards.  One reason for so few 
adjustments is that the ratio of punitive to compensatory 
damages is generally proportional or lower.  The median punitive 
damages award was only 82% of the size of the compensatory 
damages, with a mean award only 1.7 times the size of the 
compensatory component. 
Interestingly, defendants who actually challenged punitive 
damages were frequently successful in getting a reversal or 
remittal of the award.  In the twelve cases where a judicial 
modification occurred, the trial judge reduced or reversed the 
punitive damages awards in four instances.  Of the eight punitive 
damages awards reviewed by appellate courts, six verdicts were 
reduced or reversed.  The small number of appeals can be 
explained by the large number of default judgments in the 
sample as well as the large number of low ratio awards discussed 
above.  For example, in many of the high profile punitive 
damages cases, the primary defendant disappeared with a click 
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of the mouse, and for several of the largest punitive damages 
awards, the Internet mice disappeared or defaulted.203 
In a few cases, punitive damages in favor of large corporate 
actors were capped or limited by tort reforms that were originally 
enacted to protect companies.  The traditional critique of punitive 
damages is that large corporations suffer at the hands of ìjackpot 
juries.î204  The tort reform movement to limit punitive damages 
arises from the perception that it is the corporations that are 
victimized by greedy individual claimants and their lawyers.  In 
2003 alone, the corporate community convinced legislators in 
seventeen states to file proposed statutes limiting punitive 
damages as well as the doctrine of joint and several liability.205 
One of the unanticipated consequences of tort reform is that 
it may end up hurting its corporate advocates.  The business 
community in Texas, for example, viewed then governor George 
W. Bush as ìthe right man to break the back of the litigious 
culture in the Lone Star State.î206  As Governor of Texas, Bush 
ìsigned seven major bills into law, including ones that capped 
punitive damages at no more than twice actual damages plus 
$750,000.î207  In his State of the Union address in January 2003, 
President Bush noted the importance of enacting federal tort 
reforms.208  However, legal backfire, or the law of unanticipated 
consequences, posits ìthat a [new] law produces or will produce 
results directly contrary to one or more of those intended.  Legal 
backfire claims are pervasive, yet potentially misleading and 
harmful argumentation used primarily to undermine existing 
law (or policy) or to forestall the enactment of new law.î209 
Any new technology will frequently produce legal backfire 
because social changes inevitably impact legal institutions in 
entirely unpredictable ways.  The legal backfire from tort reform 
is that it impairs the corporate communityís ability to vindicate 
its rights in cyberspace.  Corporate tort reformers paint the 
ìimage of a monstrously destructive civil justice systemî that is 
 
 203 See, e.g., Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003) (imposing liability for 
conversion against domain name registrar in case in which primary defendant defaulted 
in $65 million punitive damages award); Jere Longman, Videotaped Athletes Victorious in 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002, at D8. 
 204 A search in LEXISís current news file produced 669 ìhitsî for the search ìjackpot 
w/5 jury or juries.î 
 205 Mark Ballard, 17-Front Tort War, NATíL L.J., May 12, 2003, at 1. 
 206 Christopher OíLeary, Lone Star Litigation: Are Huge Jury Awards in Texas a 
Relic?, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, May 2003, at 43, 46. 
 207 Id. at 48. 
 208 See Doctors and Tort Reform, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2003, at B6. 
 209 Robert A. Hillman, The Rhetoric of Legal Backfire, 43 B.C. L. REV. 819, 819 
(2002). 
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sapping American productivity and competitiveness.210  Many of 
the tort reform arguments could be applied with more validity to 
large corporate stakeholders using litigation to enclose the 
Internet commons.  ìNeo-conservatives often employ the theme of 
a ëculture of victimization gone wildí to ridicule [individual] 
plaintiffs seekingî redress for personal injury.211  The general 
public is amused, angered, and perplexed by accounts of loony 
tort filings publicized by tort reformers.  However, many of the 
widely disseminated tort stories are totally false or presented in 
a misleading and pejorative fashion.212 
The corporate opponents of punitive damages portray the 
civil justice system ìas greedy vulture lawyers against poor 
oppressed businesses.î213  Ironically, it appears that corporations 
are actually using punitive damages as a tool to protect their 
rights in cyberspace.  In the tort reform debates, corporate 
America is not seeking limitations on punitive damages in this 
area.  If punitive damages are evolving as a corporate sword 
rather than as a shield in cyberspace, the tort reformers may 
wish to revise their demands to eliminate or cripple the remedy. 
Tort reform has played a role in capping punitive damages 
sought by companies.  In the Simon Property Group case 
discussed earlier in this Article, the trial judge reduced a 
punitive damages award for a state unfair competition claim 
from $10 million to $50,000.214  As the court explained, ìIndiana 
law limits punitive damages to the greater of $50,000 or three 
times compensatory damages.î215  In a Virginia case, a federal 
court awarded the plaintiff $675,000 including $350,000 in 
punitive damages, that stateís upper.216  The Virginia cap of 
$350,000 has also limited punitive damages awards to America 
Online in their cases against spammers.217 
 
 210 Rustad & Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster, supra note 30, at 3. 
 211 Id. 
 212 THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 173 (2001).  
For example, ì[t]ort reformers frequently cite the case of a woman who received 
$2,699,000 in punitive damages after injuring her back opening a pickle jar.î  Id.  
However, in the actual case, the court justified the punitive damages based on the 
defendantís conduct of nearly five years, including retaliation, which was found to be 
ìëwillful, mean-spirited acts indicative of an intent to cause physical or emotional harm.íî  
Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice 
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 730 (1998) (quoting Vandevender v. Sheetz, Inc., 490 S.E.2d 
678, 693 (W. Va. 1997). 
 213 Christina Johns, Tort Reform, at http://www.cjjohns.com/c_law/tort_reform.html 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2003). 
 214 Simon Prop. Group, L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 282 F.3d 986, 990 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 215 Id. 
 216 Graham v. Oppenheimer, No. 00CV57, 2000 WL 33232110 (E.D. Va. Oct. 2000); 
Kathleen Fay, Defamed MD Awarded Maximum Punitive Damages Award in Va., E-COM. 
L. & STRATEGY, Jan. 2001, at 12. 
 217 See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Bluecard Publíg, No. 98-905-A, slip op. at 9-10 (E.D. 
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Cyberspace punitive damages flip the historic role of 
punitive damages in which individuals normally filed suit 
against powerful companies.  The typical plaintiff in Internet 
punitive litigation is a large corporation suing a defendant in the 
dark side of the Net.  Internet defendants are typically 
cybersquatters, online pornographers, spammers, or anonymous 
critics located in an offshore haven. 
Few legislators who supported tort reform could have 
anticipated that one consequence was to handcuff information-
industry leaders such as America Online, eBay, and Amazon.com 
in punishing and deterring spammers and other Internet 
predators.  Lord Devlin approved a large punitive damages 
award in an aggravated assault case observing that one should 
think of punitive damages as ìa fine which has to hit the 
defendant hard if he has disregarded the rights of others and 
show that that sort of conduct does not pay.î218  Punitive 
damages ìshould reflect ëthe enormity of [the defendantís] 
offenseíî rather than some arbitrary ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages.219  The deterrent power of punitive 
damages is significantly eroded when Internet wrongdoers can 
compute the cost of wrongdoing in advance. 
The next part of this Article explains why punitive damages 
have yet to develop in cyberspace and why they are necessary to 
fortify existing consumer protection in cyberspace. 
II. EXTENDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO INTERNET 
CONSUMERS 
Internet-related consumer fraud complaints skyrocketed 
from 49,957 to 75,063 from 2001 to 2002.220  Forty-six percent of 
the Internet fraud complaints were for losses from online auction 
fraud with a median loss of $320.221  The non-delivery of goods 
accounted for just under a third of complaints with a median loss 
of $176.222  Consumer confidence in cyberspace is impaired by 
worries about the lack of information security, data protection, 
confidentiality, and the failure of web merchants to deliver goods 
and services in a timely manner.223  The Internet is a borderless 
 
Va. Jan. 5, 2000) (reducing punitive damages in cases involving numerous deceptive 
practices of the spammers to mask their identity), available at 
http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dljunk/bluecard.html. 
 218 Loudon v. Ryder, [1953] 2 Q.B. 202, 209 (1953). 
 219 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
 220 IFCC 2002 INTERNET FRAUD REPORT, supra  note 16, at 4. 
 221 Id. at 6-7. 
 222 Id. at 6. 
 223 David Byrne, Cyberspace and Consumer Confidence, Address at the Annual 
Conference of the Kangaroo Group of MEPs (Sept. 18, 2000), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
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medium, which makes it imperative that consumers have ìaccess 
to the legal system and courts in their own country [as] an 
essential part of consumer confidence[.]î224 
The FTC is the most active Internet enforcer, but even this 
pro-active agency lacks the necessary resources to patrol 
cyberspace.  It is as if the FTC is trying to hold back a tidal wave 
of cyberfraud with a broom.225  The FTC is seeking to increase 
efforts in Internet-related enforcement, such as the regulation of 
e-mail list marketing, online auction practices, and e-mail 
sending software.226 
Hardly a day goes by without new media reports of 
consumers harmed in cyberspace, yet punitive damages in 
Internet cases are rare.227  Punitive damages awards, sometimes 
called exemplary, vindictive, penal, or retributory damages, are 
designed to punish and deter.  Section 908(2) of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts provides that ì[p]unitive damages may be 
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the 
defendantís evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights 
of others.î228  Consumers are harmed every day in Internet chat 
rooms, news groups, and computer bulletin boards by conduct 
that calls for the deterrent hammer of punitive damages.  Online 
chats may seem informal and relaxed, but an online posting in a 
chat room or on a web site may become the basis of a defamation 
lawsuit.229  Few consumers have the resources to vindicate their 
rights in the online world. 
 
dgs/health_consumer/library/speeches/speech55_en.html. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Internet enforcement is only one small sector of the FTCís responsibilities to 
protect consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices: 
The [FTC] enforces 46 federal laws, including many laws that apply to web 
sites.  Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. ßß 41-58, the 
Commission seeks to: (a) prevent unfair methods of competition, and unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce; (b) obtain money and other 
relief for injured consumers; (c) define and prevent unfair or deceptive 
practices; and (d) investigate the business, practices, and management of 
entities engaged in commerce. 
Federal Trade Commission Actions Affecting Web Sites & E-Commerce, at 
http://www.keytlaw.com/FTC/ftcactions.htm (last modified Sept. 2, 2003). 
 226 FTC Examining Spam Lists and E-Mail Sending Programs, WASH. INTERNET 
DAILY, March 28, 2002, at 1 (LEXIS, CURNWS Library). 
 227 See, e.g., Over the Counter ñ American Websites Selling Fake UK Degrees, 
OVERSEAS OVERWHELMED (Higher-Edge), Mar. 12, 2003, at http://www.higher-
edge.com/oov-archive.htm (shutting down web sites selling fake degrees from universities 
which used an address in Palmers Green, North London, to make their operations appear 
respectable, defrauding hundreds of thousands of mostly U.S. customers). 
 228 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ß 908(2) (1979). 
 229 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 35, at A33; Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly 
Traded Company, 542 S.E.2d 377, 379 (Va. 2001); Graham v. Oppenhiemer, No. 00-CV-
57, 2000 WL 33381418, at *1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 15, 2000). 
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A. Why Punitive Damages Have Not Developed For Consumers 
1. CDA Immunity Breeds Irresponsibility 
The most significant reason why there are so few consumers 
using the remedy of punitive damages in cyberspace is the 
blanket immunity granted to ISPs by Congress.  One of the 
unintended consequences of 42 U.S.C. ß 230, the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (ìCDAî),230 is that it 
immunizes unfair, deceptive, and predatory practices in 
cyberspace.  One of the statutory purposes of ß 230 was to protect 
the ìinfant industryî of online service providers, such as America 
Online, CompuServe, and Prodigy, from tort liability arising out 
of postings by customers.231  Section 230 of the CDA immunizes 
ISPs for torts committed by subscribers and third parties.232  The 
long-term consequence of ß 230 is to grant blanket immunity to 
ISPs for many torts in cyberspace.  The courts have extended ISP 
immunity to nearly every conceivable information-related tort, 
including invasion of privacy,233 and negligence.234  The result 
has been that ISPs have prevailed in nearly every tort-related 
case in the last decade.235  This broad immunity lessens the 
incentive for ISPs to develop technologies that will detect or 
control third party wrongdoing on their systems.236 
 
 230 47 U.S.C. ß 230 (2001). 
 231 Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that one of 
Congressís purposes was to insulate providers from potentially staggering tort liability). 
 232 Id. at 331. 
 233 Does v. Franco Prods., No. 99 C 7885, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8645, at *13-14 (N.D. 
Ill. June 21, 2000) (holding that ISPs that host web sites are not liable for postings by 
customers), affíd sub nom., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 234 In Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co., 723 N.E.2d. 539 (N.Y. 1999), the court held that 
Prodigy was not negligent in failing to prevent an imposter from opening up an account, 
posting vulgar messages, and sending threatening e-mails.  723 N.E.2d at 543.  The court 
recognized that if a duty was imposed on an ISP to prevent people from opening up false 
accounts and committing these types of defamatory acts, it would require an inordinate 
amount of time and money to study the transactions of millions of subscribers.  Id.  The 
court reasoned that if Prodigy was held liable for the actions of third parties, it would 
ìopen an ISP to liability for the wrongful acts of countless potential tortfeasors committed 
against countless potential victims.î  Id. 
 235 See, e.g., Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group, No. 02-1964, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
24251, at *14-15 (E.D. La., Dec. 17, 2002) (holding that Intercosmos was entitled to 
immunity under the Communications Decency Act of 1996 for both damages and 
injunctive relief for defamation, libel, or negligence based on allegedly defamatory web 
sites set up by its customers); Doe One v. Oliver, 755 A.2d 1000, 1003-04 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 2000) (holding America Online immune from improper e-mail messages sent to 
plaintiff motherís employer), affíd, 792 A.2d 911 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002), cert. denied, 796 
A.2d 556 (Conn. 2002); Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 43 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2001) (dismissing defamation lawsuit against Amazon.com for third partyís posting of 
negative comments about the authorís book on site). 
 236 Section 230 immunity for tort liability for ISPs is reminiscent of how the courts 
constructed harsh doctrines such as contributory negligence, the assumption of risk, and 
the fellow servant rule to protect nascent industry during the industrialization of 
America.  See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
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Courts have extended the impact of ß 230 by insulating 
defendants from an even greater range of tort-based lawsuits 
filed by consumers.237  In Doe v. GTE Corp.,238 a court dismissed 
an action against an ISP that ìprovided web hosting services to 
[pornographic web] sites such as ëyoungstuds.comí at which the 
hidden-camera videos were offered for sale.î239  The ISP did not 
produce or sell the tapes but ìprovided the usual package of 
services that enables someone to publish a web site over the 
Internet.î240  The package of services that GTE provided the X-
rated company consisted of: 
(1) static IP (Internet protocol) addresses through which the 
web sites may be reached (a web host sometimes registers a 
domain name that corresponds to the IP address); (2) a high-
speed physical connection through which communications pass 
between the Internetís transmission lines and the web sites; 
and (3) storage space on a server (a computer and hard disk 
that are always on) so that the content of the web sites can be 
accessed reliably.241 
The advertisements for the X-rated tapes passed over GTEís 
network and were stored on its servers.242  However, the federal 
district court held that GTE was entitled to immunity under ß 
230(c)(1).243  The court reasoned that this section was not only a 
definition but also served as immunity in blocking ìcivil liability 
when web hosts and other [ISPs] refrain from filtering or 
censoring the information on their sites.î244  The Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the finding that GTE was neither a publisher nor a 
speaker and therefore it was immunized under ß 230.245 
In Barrett v. Rosenthal,246 a California appeals court became 
the first U.S. court to hold that ß 230 does not immunize an ISP 
who republishes defamatory statements authored by a third 
party after acquiring knowledge that the statements were 
 
1780-1860, ch. 3 (1977) (arguing that the courts subsidized economic growth through the 
legal system by replacing just compensation for limited liability in tort and other 
substantive fields of law). 
 237 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.D.C. 1998) (dismissing claim on ß 
230 grounds in case involving defamatory postings).  See also Lunney v. Prodigy Servs. 
Co., 723 N.E.2d 539 (N.Y. 1999) (finding that commercial online service provider was not 
liable for defamation claim since it did not ìpublishî allegedly defamatory e-mail 
message). 
 238 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 239 Id. at 657. 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 657. 
 244 Id. at 659. 
 245 Id. at 662. 
 246 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
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false.247  The plaintiffs, Dr. Polevoy and Dr. Barrett, were two 
medical doctors ìprimarily engaged in combating the promotion 
and use of ëalternativeí or ënonstandardí healthcare practices and 
products.î248 The plaintiffs maintained Internet ì[w]eb sites that 
expos[ed] ëhealth frauds and quackeryí and provid[ed]î consumers 
with information about health care alternatives.249 
One defendant, Rosenthal, was an alternative health 
practitioner who reprinted and distributed a number of false 
accusations about the plaintiffs. The defendantís web postings 
accused the two doctors of running a ìSlea[z]y ëQuackbusterí 
Scam.î250  Dr. Polevoy was accused of stalking women and being 
a quack.251  The defendants refused to retract the statements and 
the plaintiffs filed suit for libel, conspiracy, and libel per se.252  
The trial court struck down their complaint on the grounds that 
it violated Californiaís anti-SLAPP statute.253  The trial court 
also ruled that ß 230 protected the defendant from liability and 
that the defamation claims were not supported by sufficient proof 
that the plaintiffs suffered monetary losses.254  The appellate 
court affirmed the application of the anti-SLAPP statute as to Dr. 
Barrett, but not as to Dr. Polevoy.255  The appellate court also 
ruled that the trial court erred in requiring Dr. Polevoy to prove 
damages since the defamatory language posted on the web site 
was libel per se.256   
The court ruled that the federal immunity of ß 230 was 
inapplicable since Rosenthal was a ìuser of an interactive 
computer serviceî and a primary publisher who was strictly 
liable for libelous statements.257  The court ruled that ß 230 does 
not ìabrogate the common law principle that one who republishes 
defamatory matter originated by a third person is subject to 
[distributor] liability if he or she knows or has reason to know of 
its defamatory character.î258  The court refused to follow a Fourth 
Circuit opinion that ß 230 ìimmunized providers and users of 
interactive computer services from liability not only as primary 
 
 247 Id. at 167. 
 248 Id. at 144. 
 249 Id. 
 250 Id. at 146 (alteration in original). 
 251 Barrett, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 149. 
 252 Id. at 145. 
 253 Id. at 143-44.  The court noted that the California statute barred strategic 
lawsuits against public participation.  Id. 
 254 Id. at 146. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Barrett, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 146-47. 
 257 Id. at 151. 
 258 Id. at 152 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, ß 581(1)) (emphasis omitted). 
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publishers but also as distributors.î259  The court reasoned that 
providers or users who knowingly distribute defamatory 
materials produced by third parties should be subject to 
liability.260  The court noted that ß 230, on its face, did not clearly 
address whether Congress intended to overthrow the well-
established common law principle of distributor liability.261  
However, after a review of the legislative history, the court 
observed that the survival of distributor liability was consistent 
with ß 230.262 
It may be that the Barrett case is ushering in a new era 
when courts will begin to retrench and reform ß 230 to the 
balance between immunity and tort responsibility.  The court in 
Barrett compared the ìlack of clarity as to the boundary of the 
immunity [in the CDA to] the specificity of the immunity granted 
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Actî (ìDMCAî).263  It 
may be proper to grant immunity for publishing content supplied 
by third parties; however, it is improper to extend that liability to 
transmitting knowingly libelous statements.  Congress should 
make it clear that distributorship liability may be imposed for 
transmitting defamatory statements after acquiring notice.  
Congress could, for example, enact safe harbor provisions that 
parallel the intermediary liability standards of the Digital 
Millenium Copyright Act.  One promising reform would be to 
implement a  ìtake-downî policy like the one Congress enacted in 
the DMCA.264  The DMCAís safe harbor provisions,265 unlike ß 
230 of the CDA, balance freedom of expression against copyright 
infringement.266 
The DMCA limits the potential liability of ISPs only if they 
satisfy the safe harbor provisions.267  With few exceptions, a 
 
 259 Id. at 153-54 (declining to follow Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 
1997)). 
 260 Id. at 152. 
 261 Barrett, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 155-58. 
 262 Id. at 167. 
 263 Id. at 158 n.11 (citing 17 U.S.C. ß 512). 
 264 The DMCA limits online providersí liability for usersí copyright infringement so 
long as the provider takes down the offending material promptly upon notice.  17 U.S.C. ß 
512(c) (1996 & Supp. 2003).  The DMCA was signed into law by President Clinton in 
1998.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998: U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY 1 (1998), available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/d 
mca.pdf.  The DMCA amends the federal Copyright Act in Title 17 of the United States 
Code to develop greater protection for materials transmitted in the Internet environment.  
Id. at 3.  One of the more controversial provisions of the DMCA is the prohibition against 
circumventing technological measures controlling access to works provided by the 
Copyright Act.  17 U.S.C. ß 1201 (1996 & Supp. 2003). 
 265 17 U.S.C. ß 512(a), (c). 
 266 Barrett, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 158 n.11. 
 267 The DMCA does not confer an absolute immunity upon ISPs like 42 U.S.C. ß 230 
because the immunities of ISPs are limited to specific functions they perform.  See 17 
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party satisfying the requirements for one of the safe harbors 
cannot be liable for monetary, injunctive, or other equitable 
relief.268  A reconstructed ß 230 of the CDA would only grant ISP 
tort immunity if it fulfilled the requirements for a safe harbor.  
An ISP could, for example, be immune from tort liability unless it 
knew or should have known that the tortious activity was 
occurring on its system and aided in the accomplishment of the 
direct tortfeasorís purpose by allowing the postings to continue. 
2. Internet Usage of Trade That Waives Consumer 
Protection 
a. Adhesive Internet Consumer Contracts 
Another significant reason why punitive damages have not 
yet evolved to protect consumers in cyberspace is because of 
contracts of adhesion.269  Consumers are largely foreclosed from 
the possibility of seeking punitive damages by adhesive license 
agreements and web site terms of service agreements.270  The 
U.S. Internet and software industry universally require 
consumers to waive any meaningful warranties and tort 
remedies and to agree to litigate disputes in distant and 
inconvenient forums. 
i. Internet Choice of Forum Clauses 
  ìChoice of forumî is a contractual provision that 
predetermines the judicial or arbitral forum in the event of a 
dispute arising out of an Internet or web site agreement.  For 
example, Disney requires all disputes to be decided in a state or 
federal court located in Los Angeles County,271 and Nokia 
requires disputes to be submitted to an arbitrator in Finland.272  
In addition, America Onlineís forum selection clause for its 
members provides that ìëexclusive jurisdiction for any claim or 
 
U.S.C. ß 512(a), (c). 
 268 17 U.S.C. ß 512 (providing a rather narrow exception under ß 512(j)). 
 269 See generally Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of AdhesionóSome Thoughts About 
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943) (noting that the concept of 
adhesion contracts refers to contracts in which the weaker party must adhere to the 
stronger partyís terms). 
 270 See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(enforcing an arbitration clause in a shrink-wrap license); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 
F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing shrink-wrap license term).  See generally 
Michael Rustad & Lori E. Eisenschmidt, The Commercial Law of Internet Security, 10 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 213, 289-93 (1995). 
 271 Jurisdictional Clauses in Current Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Contracts, 
Consumer Project on Technology, at http://www.cptech.org/ecom/ucita/licenses/jurisdiction 
.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2004) (citing clause in Disneyís terms of service or license 
agreement) [hereinafter Jurisdictional Clauses]. 
 272 Id. 
RUSTAD FINAL - MAY 28 5/28/2004 4:30 PM 
2004] Chapman Law Review 86 
dispute with AOL or relating in any way to your membership 
with or your use of AOL resides in the courts of Virginia.íî273 
ii. Internet Choice-of-Law Clauses 
Internet merchants use choice-of-law clauses to 
predetermine the legal remedies that apply for disputes involving 
the online contract.  Dell Financial Services, for example, 
requires that the law of Texas govern all claims relating to its 
web site.274  The Alturian GPS Software web site applies the law 
of Belgium in the event of disputes.275  The licensing agreement 
of RealNetworks, Inc. requires consumers to resolve all disputes 
before binding arbitration applying Washington state law.276 
If, for example, a consumer violated the RealNetworks 
license agreement by exceeding the scope of its use restrictions, 
the company could seek an injunction in federal court, a right not 
granted to consumers.277  United States courts have been inclined 
to enforce Internet or software license agreements with terms 
inimical to consumer welfare such as pro-vendor forum selection 
clauses, anti-warranties, and limitations of remedies.278  In 
general, courts have been willing to enforce Internet contracts so 
long as the user has an opportunity to review the terms of the 
contract and manifest assent to the license agreement.279  During 
the 1990s, companies were able to avoid many contractual 
 
 273 Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., No. 3:03cvl048, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22019, at *2 
(D. Conn. Dec. 5, 2003) (quoting America Online Member Agreement), vacated, No. 
3:03cv1048, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1388 (D. Conn. Jan. 30, 2004). 
 274 Jurisdictional Clauses, supra note 271. 
 275 Id. 
 276 REALNETWORKS, INC. END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT, RealNetworks, 
Inc., at http://web.nps.navy.mil/nssliao/realplayer/playrlic.html (last visited Jan. 31, 
2004). 
 277 Id.  RealNetworks (ìRNî) requires consumers to waive access to U.S. courts while 
reserving its own rights.  For any violation of RN intellectual property rights, ìRN may 
seek injunctive relief, or any other appropriate relief, in any court of competent 
jurisdiction.î  Id. 
 278 See, e.g., Hughes v. McMenamon, 204 F. Supp. 2d 178, 181 (D. Mass. 2002) 
(finding that subscriber agreed to the license agreement and the forum selection clause 
was enforceable); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 530, 532-33 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (upholding forum selection clause where subscribers to online 
software were required to review license terms in scrollable window and to click ìI Agreeî 
or ìI Donít Agreeî); Groff v. Am. Online, Inc., No. PC 97-0331, 1998 WL 307001, at *6 (R.I. 
Super. Ct. May 27, 1998) (holding user was bound by forum selection clause in online 
license agreement); Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 204-05 (Tex. App. 
2001) (upholding forum selection clause in online contract for registering Internet domain 
names that required users to scroll through terms before accepting or rejecting them). 
 279 See, e.g., Caspi, 732 A.2d at 532 (enforcing mass market agreement even though 
the user could assent without scrolling to the bottom of the license agreement by clicking 
the ìI agreeî icon on the screen).  See generally Christina L. Kunz et al., Click-Through 
Agreements: Strategies for Avoiding Disputes on Validity of Assent, 57 BUS. LAW. 401, 402-
03 (2001) (citing cases that consider the userís ease or difficulty of viewing terms as a 
major factor in enforcing licensing agreements). 
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disputes with consumers by convincing courts to enforce one-
sided choice-of-law provisions and other adhesive Internet 
contracts. 
The U.S. market-based approach assumes that it is enough 
consumer protection for Internet merchants and software 
vendors to simply make adequate disclosures that the consumers 
are waiving their legal rights and remedies.  The theory 
underlying ìadequate disclosureî is that consumers will choose 
vendors with more favorable license terms.280  However, this is 
not possible in the Internet industry where consumers are 
required to waive their rights and remedies.  The practical 
reality is that consumers have no legal recourse against Internet 
merchants. 
It is improbable that a U.S. consumer will opt to file a claim 
that must be filed across the country or in an overseas venue.  
ì[R]equiring consumers to travel to a foreign and oftentimes 
remote forum to seek redress in an unfamiliar legal system . . . 
would in many cases effectively deny consumers access to judicial 
redress.î281 
The Internet challenges choice-of-law principles because it 
ìis not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network 
which interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked 
computer networks.î282  Punitive damages arising out of 
consumer transactions in cyberspace will be stillborn if U.S. 
courts continue to enforce choice-of-law and forum-selection 
clauses.  Punitive damages cannot develop if choice-of-law and 
forum clauses are considered to be ìprima facie valid and should 
be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to 
be ëunreasonableí under the circumstances.î283 
b. Waiver of Internet Consumerís Right to Seek Tort 
Remedies 
A Dilbert cartoon lampoons these adhesion contracts by 
depicting a licensee who unwraps the shrink-wrap only to learn 
that he has become Bill Gateís towel boy.284  In the cartoon, 
Dilbert states, ìI didnít read all of the shrink-wrap license 
agreement on my new software until after I opened it.  
 
 280 Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and 
Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1806, 1810 (2000). 
 281 Karen Stewart & Joseph Matthews, Online Arbitration of Cross-Border, Business 
to Consumer Disputes, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1126 (2002). 
 282 CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (S.D. Ohio 
1997). 
 283 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972). 
 284 Scott Adams, Dilbert, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1997, at D2. 
RUSTAD FINAL - MAY 28 5/28/2004 4:30 PM 
2004] Chapman Law Review 88 
Apparently, I agreed to spend the rest of my life as a towel boy in 
Bill Gatesí[s] new mansion.î285  Shrink-wrap and web-wrap 
contracts are standard form contracts for the electronic age.  The 
standard form contract dominates cyberspace just as it 
dominates every other domain of everyday life.286 
In the typical mass-market license agreement, consumers 
routinely waive their right to seek punitive damages and 
foreclose the possibility of all but the most limited remedy under 
the UCC.  Online users are offered ìtake it-or-leave itî web-wrap 
or terms of service consumers agreements that foreclose the 
possibility of punitive damages and any other tort remedy.287  
Nearly every Internet merchant dictates the choice-of-law as a 
condition for accessing its services or using its goods.  No 
consumer negotiates with Bill Gates or Jeff Bezos in the Internet 
economy.  Requiring consumers to waive their rights to a jury 
trial is a controversial practice because the Internet industry is 
unwilling to give even the most rudimentary implied warranties 
of quality.  One can read thousands of click-stream, click-wrap, 
shrink-wrap, and terms of service agreements and never find a 
single Internet vendor willing to provide meaningful warranties 
or remedies for its software, software products, or services.   
The typical Internet-related mass-market license agreement 
provides no warranties of any kind and forecloses any remedy by 
requiring the consumer to litigate in a forum of the vendorís 
choice, which is often in a distant forum.  The following anti-
warranties clause of an online pharmacy is fairly typical of what 
consumers encounter in cyberspace: 
Disclaimer of Warranties. YOU EXPRESSLY UNDERSTAND 
THAT AND AGREE THAT: 
a.  YOUR USE OF THE SERVICE IS AT [YOUR] SOLE 
RISK.  THE SERVICE IS PROVIDED ON AN ìAS ISî 
 
 285 Id. 
 286 Shrink-wrap contracts are the newest form of standard form contracts that 
predominate our everyday life.  Professor Slawson wrote in 1971 that: 
  Standard form contracts probably account for more than ninety-nine 
percent of all the contracts now made.  Most persons have difficulty 
remembering the last time they contracted other than by standard form; except 
for casual oral agreements, they probably never have.  But if they are active, 
they contract by standard form several times a day.  Parking lot and theater 
tickets, package receipts, department store charge slips, and gas station credit 
card purchase slips are all standard form contracts. 
  . . . The contracting still imagined by courts and law teachers as typical, in 
which both parties participate in choosing the language of their entire 
agreement, is no longer of much more than historical importance. 
W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking 
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971). 
 287 See Braucher, supra note 260, at 1832. 
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AND ìAS AVAILABLEî BASIS.  PHARMACY CHOICE 
EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES OF ANY 
KIND, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, 
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR 
A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NON-
INFRINGEMENT. 
b.  PHARMACY CHOICE MAKES NO WARRANTY THAT (i) 
THE SERVICE WILL MEET YOUR REQUIREMENTS, 
(ii) THE SERVICE WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED, 
TIMELY, SECURE, EFFICIENT, OR ERROR FREE, (iii) 
THE RESULTS THAT MAY BE OBTAINED FROM THE 
USE OF THE SERVICE WILL BE ACCURATE OR 
RELIABLE, (iv) THE QUALITY OF ANY PRODUCT, 
SERVICE, INFORMATION, OR OTHER MATERIAL 
PURCHASED OR OBTAINED BY YOU THROUGH THE 
SERVICE WILL MEET YOUR EXPECTATIONS, AND (v) 
ANY ERRORS IN THE SOFTWARE WILL BE 
CORRECTED. 
c.  ANY MATERIAL DOWNLOADED OR OTHERWISE 
OBTAINED THROUGH THE USE OF THE SERVICE IS 
DONE AT YOUR OWN RISK AND DISCRETION.  YOU 
WILL BE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY DAMAGE 
TO YOUR COMPUTER SYSTEM OR LOSS OF DATA 
THAT RESULTS FROM THE DOWNLOAD OF ANY 
SUCH MATERIAL. 
d.  NO ADVICE OR INFORMATION, WHETHER ORAL OR 
WRITTEN, OBTAINED BY YOU FROM PHARMACY 
CHOICE OR THROUGH OR FROM THE SERVICE 
SHALL CREATE ANY WARRANTY NOT EXPRESSLY 
STATED . . . . 
e.  NEITHER PHARMACY CHOICE NOR YOU MAY 
MODIFY OR WAIVE THE DISCLAIMERS PROVIDED 
FOR IN THIS SECTION . . . .  NO ORAL 
MODIFICATIONS OR WAIVER OF THIS DISCLAIMER 
SHALL BE VALID OR BINDING ON PHARMACY 
CHOICE.288 
Amazon.comís terms of service agreement forecloses 
consumers from seeking punitive damages or any other type of 
tort damages.289  The most popular search engine, Google.com, 
has a term of service that precludes the possibility of obtaining 
 
 288 Pharmacy Choice Terms and Conditions of Service, at http://www.pharmacychoice 
.com/home/terms.cfm (last visited Jan. 26, 2004). 
 289 Conditions of Use, at http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/508088/102-
6759433-7263313 (last visited Jan. 26, 2004) (ìAMAZON.COM WILL NOT BE LIABLE 
FOR ANY DAMAGES OF ANY KIND ARISING FROM THE USE OF THIS SITE, 
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE, 
AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.î). 
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punitive damages: 
Under no circumstances shall Google be liable to any user on 
account of that userís use or misuse of Google Web APIs.  Such 
limitation of liability shall apply to prevent recovery of direct, 
indirect, incidental, consequential, special, exemplary, and 
punitive damages whether such claim is based on warranty, 
contract, tort (including negligence), or otherwise, [(]even if 
Google has been advised of the possibility of such damages).290 
The eBay User Agreement requires its users to ìread, agree 
with and accept all of the terms and conditions contained in this 
User Agreement and the Privacy Policy, which include those 
terms and conditions expressly set out below and those 
incorporated by reference,î before they can access the eBay 
system.291  One of the terms of service for eBay is the absolute 
prohibition on seeking punitive damages under any doctrinal 
theory.292 
c. Mandatory Consumer Protection in Cyberspace 
The solution to adhesive Internet contracts is to either 
extend punitive damages to cyberspace or adopt a system of 
ìthickî regulations such as the European Union regime of 
mandatory consumer protection terms.293  None of the countries 
of the European Union other than the United Kingdom recognize 
the doctrine of punitive damages.294  The Brussels Regulation, for 
 
 290 Terms and Conditions for Google Web API Service, at http://www.google.com/apis/ 
api_terms.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2004). 
 291 User Agreement, at http://pages.ebay.com/help/community/png-user.html (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2004). 
 292 The user agreement states: 
UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL EBAY BE LIABLE TO ANY USER 
ON ACCOUNT OF THAT USERíS USE OR MISUSE OF EBAY TOOLBAR.  
SUCH LIMITATION OF LIABILITY SHALL APPLY TO PREVENT 
RECOVERY OF DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, 
SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES WHETHER SUCH 
CLAIM IS BASED ON WARRANTY, CONTRACT, TORT (INCLUDING 
NEGLIGENCE), OR OTHERWISE, (EVEN IF EBAY HAS BEEN ADVISED 
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES). 
User License Agreement, http://pages.ebay.com/ebay_toolbar/download.html (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2004). 
 293 The European Union (ìEUî) was formed in the 1950s and now includes fifteen 
member states located in the Eurozone.  James E. Pfander, Member State Liability and 
Constitutional Change in the United States and Europe, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 237, 239 
(2003).  The EU is set to add another ten member states in 2004.  Id.  ìThe European 
Council refers to meetings of the heads of state of the 15 [EU] member states.î  RUSTAD & 
DAFTARY, supra note 76, at ß 8.02[A].  The European Unionís key consumer protection 
directives address distance selling, data protection, and e-commerce.  Id. 
 294 See Christopher Hodges, Multi-Party Actions: A European Approach, 11 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INTíL L. 321, 330 (2001) (ìNo European jurisdiction generally permits punitive 
damages . . . .î).  But see Rookes v. Barnard, 1964 A.C. 1129, 1131 (H.L. 1964) (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (noting that in the United Kingdom, a restricted form of exemplary 
damages is recognized in a handful of aggravating circumstances). 
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example, gives consumers the right to sue suppliers in their 
home court.295  It provides that if a business ìpursues commercial 
or professional activities in the Member State,î then the 
consumer may sue in the court where he or she is domiciled.296  
The far-reaching consumer provisions also apply to U.S. 
companies targeting European consumers in Internet 
transactions.297  Therefore, European Union rules will likely 
become the de facto consumer protection law for the Internet 
since non-European Union countries will be subject to its rules. 
The European Union model tacitly assumes that mandatory 
consumer protection is required in cyberspace and elsewhere.  
The Distance Selling Directive, for example, requires sellers to 
provide consumers with information about the identity of the 
supplier, the main characteristics of goods and services including 
taxes, delivery costs, arrangements for payment, the existence of 
a right of withdrawal, the period for which the offer remains 
valid, and the minimum duration of the contract.298 
The European Directive on Consumer Goods contains 
provisions that apply equally well to Internet sales.299  The 
Directive, for example, gives consumers a two-year period to 
exercise rights as to defective products.300  The Directive 
presumes that any non-conformity found in the first six months 
after delivery existed at tender, and European consumers under 
the Consumer Goods Directive have a right of repair or 
replacement without charge or inconvenience.301  Under the 
Directive, any waiver of rights in a contractual agreement signed 
by European consumers is not binding.302 
 
 295 The European Union countries are promulgating some of the most extensive 
regulations of cyberspace.  Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1.  The Brussels Regulation replaces the 1968 Brussels 
Convention effective March 2002.  Id. at 14, 16.  The Brussels Regulation applies to all 
EU countries that signed the Brussels Convention of 1968 except Denmark.  Id. at 3.  The 
new Brussels Regulation has not yet supplanted the Lugano Convention of 1988.  Id. at 1, 
14-15.  The Brussels Regulation governs jurisdiction in civil and commercial disputes 
between litigants and provides for the enforcement of judgments.  Id. at 3, 11. 
 296 Id. at 6.  Article 15(1)(c) extends the consumer home forum rule to entities that 
direct activities to Member States.  Id. 
 297 See id. at 7.  The Brussels Regulation has legal force in the Member States of the 
European Union.  However, U.S. companies with a presence in a Member State and 
conducting business with European consumers would be subject to the pro-consumer 
home court rule.  Thomas C. Vinje and Ann-Charlotte Hogberg, Whose Law Governs in 
EU?: Draft ìRome IIî Regulation Threatens Certainty of 2000 Directive, N.Y. LAW 
JOURNAL, April 30, 2001, at S3. 
 298 European Parliament & Council Directive 97/7/EC, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19-27. 
 299 European Parliament & Council Directive 1999/44/EC, 1999 O.J. (L 171) 12. 
 300 Id. at 15. 
 301 Id. 
 302 Id. at 16. 
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Internet contracts with European consumers must also 
comply with the Unfair Terms Directive.303  The Directive has an 
express policy of policing unfair terms where there is an 
imbalance of power between the company and consumer.304  It 
applies to a wide range of one-sided Internet contracts where the 
terms are offered on a ìtake-it-or-leave-itî basis.  Any ambiguity 
in a consumer contract is construed against the company in favor 
of the consumer.305  The central provision of the Unfair Terms 
Directive is that contractual terms found to be unfair are 
unenforceable.306  In contrast, the U.S. market-based approach 
tends to be opposed to such pro-welfaristic consumer protection 
regimes.  The extension of punitive damages to protect 
consumers is consistent with the U.S. pro-market approach with 
its emphasis on flexibility and pragmatism. 
B. Extending Punitive Damages for Consumer and Individual 
Protection in Cyberspace 
Few consumer lawyers have the resources to pursue an 
Internet wrongdoer capable of fleeing the jurisdiction with the 
click of the mouse.  Even if the Internet wrongdoer can be 
located, there remains a problem with default judgments.  
Consumers will be more likely to obtain collectible judgments 
from Internet elephants rather than elusive mice, but may not be 
aware that attorneys are available to work on a contingency 
basis.  Alternatively, the amount of money involved may be so 
miniscule for any one Internet user that the victim may not feel 
that he or she has the time, energy, or expertise to prosecute a 
fraudulent Internet merchant.  Many Internet users may each 
have a small loss resulting from a pattern and practice of 
dishonesty. 
1. Remedy for Socially Compensable Damages   
The legal environment of the Internet is a perfect venue for 
an expanded remedy of punitive damages.  Judge Guido 
Calabresi drew the classic distinction between specific deterrence 
that makes the wrongdoer pay the price of wrongdoing and the 
larger social sanction of general deterrence, which vindicates the 
harm to society.307  The concept of general deterrence may be 
seen in the earliest exemplary damages cases where awards were 
 
 303 Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29. 
 304 Id. 
 305 Id. 
 306 Id. 
 307 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 877 & n.13 (1998). 
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made ìfor exampleís sake.î308  Punitive damages against spam e-
mailers are good examples of what Judge Calabresi defines as 
ìsocially compensatory damages.î309  The purpose of socially 
compensatory damages is ìto make society whole,î as opposed to 
compensatory damages, which are ìassessed to make the 
individual victim whole.î310  Tort lawís capacity to efficiently 
punish and deter conduct through socially compensable damages 
is central to Judge Calabresiís theory of punitive damages.311  
Judge Calabresi argues that in many cases ìcompensatory 
damages are . . . an inaccurate measure of the true harm caused 
by an activity.î312 
Consumers need a fortified punitive damages remedy 
precisely for purposes of optimal deterrence.  Ordinary damages 
are an insufficient deterrent where the gain to the defendant 
exceeds any compensable injury.  General deterrence requires 
punitive damages to convince other Internet wrongdoers that 
there is no profit in wrongdoing.  Merely requiring an Internet 
company to disgorge the amount by which it was unjustly 
enriched is an insufficient deterrent.  Without the threat of 
uncapped punitive damages, it would be beneficial for the 
fraudulent Internet business to wait until it was discovered or 
sued before disgorging what was owed.  As the court stated in 
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co.,313 if it were not for punitive damages 
then ì[s]ome may think it cheaper to pay damages or a forfeiture 
than to change a business practice.î314  The purpose of punitive 
damages in cyberspace is the same as in the bricks-and-mortar 
world of compensating the larger society for uncompensated 
external costs.315  Punitive damages are ìan appropriate way of 
making the injurer bear all the costs associated with its 
activities.î316  In the first decade of cyberspace punitive damages, 
there have been some notable examples where the remedy served 
to root out socially harmful web site activity. 
2. Serving as a Death Penalty to Internet Harassment 
ìCyberstalking refers to the use of the Internet, e-mail, or 
other electronic means to repeatedly threaten, follow, or harass 
 
 308 Tullidge v. Wade, 95 Eng. Rep. 909, 909 (K.B. 1769). 
 309 Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 245 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., 
concurring). 
 310 Id. (Calabresi, J. concurring). 
 311 Id. at 243, 245 (Calabresi, J. concurring). 
 312 Id. at 244 (Calabresi, J. concurring). 
 313 294 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. 1980). 
 314 Id. at 451 (citing Walker v. Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d 497, 499 (N.Y. 1961)). 
 315 In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 316 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 244 (Calabresi, J. concurring). 
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another person.î317  Internet wrongdoers, for example, have 
harmed women by maliciously posting personal information on 
sadomasochistic web sites and by using new morphing 
technologies to superimpose their victimís face onto pornographic 
pictures.318  For example, an online stalker who posted profane, 
derogatory, and harassing messages threatening violence to 
female musicians was assessed with punitive damages.319 
In Hitchcock v. Woodside Literary Agency,320 Jayne 
Hitchcock, a University of Maryland teaching assistant, alleged 
she was the victim of a campaign of electronic terror by an online 
company.321  Ms. Hitchcockís nightmare began when she 
answered a web site advertisement soliciting writing samples 
from ìëpublished and unpublished authors.íî322  After submitting 
a writing sample, she received a letter from Woodside Literary 
Agency (ìWLAî) praising her writing and soliciting her to 
forward a full manuscript to the agency, ìalong with a $75 
ëreading and market evaluation fee.íî323  She mailed a second 
sample of her writing to WLA using her maiden name.324  WLA 
responded with a virtually identical letter save for soliciting a 
$150 reading fee.325  Ms. Hitchcock concluded that WLA was 
nothing more than a scam soliciting bogus fees from consumers 
seeking to become writers.326  She posted warnings about WLA 
on various Internet bulleting boards observing that ìlegitimate 
literary agencies did not charge ëreading fees.íî327 
Hitchcock allegedly became the target for a systematic 
campaign of online harassment by anonymous parties.328  The 
harassment took diverse forms, including the posting of messages 
that falsely claimed that Hitchcock was the author of 
pornography.329  She also received a number of crude e-mail 
messages, which placed her in fear of sexual assault.330  Her e-
mail accounts were flooded, and offensive messages were sent to 
 
 317 RUSTAD & DAFTARY, supra note 76, at ß 5.03[A] (emphasis omitted). 
 318 See, e.g., Butler v. Krebs, No. 96-1204096, 1998 WL 2023763 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June 
8, 1998) (awarding punitive damages against airline and pilot for superimposing nude 
image of female pilot on web site and intranet). 
 319 Stockdale v. Baba, 795 N.E.2d 727, 730-33 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003). 
 320 15 F. Supp. 2d 246 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 321 Id. at 249. 
 322 Id. at 248. 
 323 Id. at 249. 
 324 Id. 
 325 Hitchcock, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 249. 
 326 Id. 
 327 Id. 
 328 Id. 
 329 Id. 
 330 Hitchcock, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 249. 
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third parties under her name.331  Despite this clear pattern of 
systematic online harassment, the federal court dismissed 
Hitchcockís RICO332 claim for failure to state a claim since the 
defendants could not, by law, constitute a criminal enterprise.333  
In the end, the consumer had no remedy available for such 
pervasive e-mail harassment and the ìe-mail bombsî that shut 
her e-mail account down.  The Hitchcock case illustrates the need 
for strong consumer self-help remedies to punish egregious 
misconduct in cyberspace. 
Punitive damages are beginning to be employed to restrain 
web sites threatening violence.  In Planned Parenthood of 
Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life 
Activists,334 anti-abortion activists posted ìGUILTYî posters 
identifying the names, addresses, and photographs of physicians 
that provided abortions.335  The web site developed by the 
American Coalition of Life Activists (ìACLAî) personally 
identified the plaintiffs on ìDeadly Dozen ëGUILTYíî posters.336  
Additionally, ACLA compiled the ìNuremberg Filesî to collect 
evidence against abortion doctors so that they could one day be 
placed on trial for crimes against humanity.337  ìThe ëGUILTYí 
posters identifying specific physicians were circulated in the 
wake of a series of ëWANTEDí and ëunWANTEDí posters that had 
identified other doctors who performed abortions before they 
were murdered.î338 
The plaintiffs argued that the distribution of the Old West-
style Deadly Dozen ìWANTEDî posters identifying the abortion 
providers constituted a threat of force under the federal Freedom 
of Access to Clinics Entrances Act.339  In three prior incidents, a 
ìwantedî-type poster identifying a specific doctor who provided 
abortion services was circulated, and the doctor named on the 
poster was killed.340  The jury returned a verdict in the 
 
 331 Id. 
 332 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (ìRICOî), 18 U.S.C. ßß 
1961-1968 (2003), requires that the plaintiff demonstrate ìthat a defendant, employed by 
or associated with an enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce, conducted or 
participated in the conduct of this enterpriseís affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity.î  Hitchcock, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 333 Id. at 249-50. 
 334 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2637 (2003). 
 335 Id. at 1062. 
 336 Id. at 1064. 
 337 Id. at 1062. 
 338 Id. 
 339 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1062.  ì[The Freedom of Access to Clinics Act] 
gives aggrieved persons a right of action against whoever by ëthreat of force . . . 
intentionally . . . intimidates . . . any person because that person is or has been . . . 
providing reproductive health services.íî  Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C ß 248 (a)(1), (c)(1)(A)). 
 340 Id. at 1063-64. 
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physiciansí favor, including  $108.5 million in punitive 
damages.341  The district court also ìenjoined ACLA from 
publishing the posters or providing other materials with the 
specific intent to threaten [the physicians].î342  The court found 
that the defendants had ìacted with specific intent and malice in 
a blatant and illegal communication of true threats to kill, 
assault or do bodily harm to each of the plaintiffs and with the 
specific intent to interfere with or intimidate the plaintiffs from 
engaging in legal medical practices and procedures.î343 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the web site 
constituted a true threat as defined under the Freedom of Access 
to Clinics Entrances Act and affirmed the ACLAís liability, but 
vacated the $108.5 million punitive damages award for the 
district court to determine whether it comported with due 
process.344  Due to the Ninth Circuitís decision, the threat of 
further punitive damages awards has resulted in a number of 
providers unplugging the ìNuremberg Filesî site and other anti-
choice sites, including the ìAbortionCamsî web site, ìwhich 
features thousands of photographs and videos of abortion clinic 
staff, patients and escorts.î345 
Spam e-mailers are continually engaging in cost-benefit 
analyses to determine whether a given activity is worth the 
price.346  In the calculation of expected profits, the Internet 
wrongdoer will likely allow for possible refunds to those victims 
who object too vigorously, and will be perfectly content to bear 
the additional cost of litigation as the price for continuing an 
illicit business.  ìIt stands to reason that the chances of deterring 
[people] are materially increased by subjecting [them] to the 
payment of punitive damages.î347 
3. Punishing Incendiary Flame Wars in Cyberspace 
Punitive damages have begun to evolve as a social control 
against incendiary e-mail exchanges or web site postings.  
Consider the case of a 27-year-old British lawyer who received a 
 
 341 Id. at 1066 n.4. 
 342 Id. at 1063. 
 343 Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1154 (D. Or. 1999), affíd in part, revíd in part, 290 F.3d 
1058 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 344 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1063, 1086. 
 345 Frederick Clarkson, New Version of Nuremberg Files Yanked Off Web, at 
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/1627/context/archive (last visited Jan. 
28, 2004).  ìThe American Coalition of Life Activists subsequently folded, though most of 
its leaders remain active anti-choice militants.î  Id. 
 346 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 68-69 (1970). 
 347 Walker v. Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d 497, 499 (N.Y. 1961). 
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spicy e-mail message at work from his girlfriend.348  The tactless 
lawyer forwarded the e-mail to several others, ìboasting, ëNow 
THATíS a nice compliment from a lass, isnít it?íî349  A week later, 
the firmís web site ìcrashed after receiving 70,000 hits in a single 
day.î350  The lawyerís careless e-mail caused him to be disciplined 
by his law firm and castigated in the court of public opinion.  
This case is an example of the types of e-mails that can cause a 
suit for punitive damages. 
In Mathis v. Cannon,351 the plaintiff filed a defamation claim 
against an Internet poster who accused him of being a thief and a 
crook in an online forum addressing concerns about a solid waste 
recovery facility.352  The Internet-related postings were the result 
of impassioned debates over the expenditure of the countyís 
resources for the ill-fated facility.353  However, the plaintiff was 
barred from seeking punitive damages because he did not seek a 
retraction, which was a prerequisite to filing his defamation 
complaint.354 
C. Protecting Individual Reputations in Cyberspace 
Punitive damages are evolving to restrain abusive 
information-based torts in cyberspace.  For example, a University 
of North Dakota physics professor filed a lawsuit against a 
former student who posted an article about him on the 
Internet.355  The student accused the professor ìof being a 
pedophile and having odd sexual habits.î356  The professor won 
his case and received a punitive damages award for the studentís 
postings.357 
Damages awarded in online defamation cases frequently 
involve head-on collisions with the First Amendment.  The facts 
of Griffis v. Luban358 exemplify the typical online defamation 
case, arising out of an incendiary exchange of e-mails and 
postings to a web site.  In Griffis, a Minnesota resident was 
assessed damages in an Alabama court default judgment after 
being sued for posting Internet messages challenging the 
 
 348 Jeffrey Rosen, In Lieu of Manners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001 (Magazine), at 46. 
 349 Id. 
 350 Id. 
 351 573 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 2002). 
 352 Id. at 377, 379. 
 353 Id. at 378-79. 
 354 Id. at 386. 
 355 Carlson, supra note 35, at A33. 
 356 Id. 
 357 Wagner v. Miskin, 660 N.W.2d 593, 595-96 (N.D. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 
1156 (2004). 
 358 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 906 (2003). 
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credentials of an Egyptologist.359  The Minnesota resident posted 
on a web forum that the Alabama scholar had ìobtain[ed] her 
degree from a ëbox of Cracker Jacks.íî360  The Alabama court 
entered a default judgment for $25,000 in money damages and 
an injunction to prevent future defamatory postings.361  In an 
unpublished decision, a Minnesota Court of Appeal overturned 
the Alabama injunction as an invalid prior restraint in violation 
of the First Amendment.362  The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled 
that the Alabama judgment was not entitled to full faith and 
credit because the Alabama court lacked personal jurisdiction.363  
The court ruled that the Alabama courtís exercise of jurisdiction 
was in error because the postings by the plaintiff were not aimed 
at the Alabama forum.364 
D. Expanded Consumer Protection Through Punitive Justice 
Deterrence will only occur when the tortfeasors are held 
accountable for their conduct in cyberspace.  Given the difficulty 
Internet consumers have in detecting, let alone pursuing, 
Internet fraudsters, the cost of wrongdoing must be steep enough 
to convince even the Internet mice not to repeat the conduct.  
Internet elephants must also be punished in excess of their profit 
in order to deter similar future behavior.  Accordingly, effective 
deterrence cannot be achieved without at least the threat of 
uncapped punitive damages. 
Punitive damages are necessary in cyberspace to punish and 
deter wrongful acts such as improper billing, excessive charges, 
and consumer chiseling.  Suppose an ISP decides to skim $10 off 
each consumerís account over a two-year period.  The provider 
can count on the likelihood that only a small fraction of 
consumers will detect the excessive charges.  It is also likely that 
not every consumer who detects the skimming will successfully 
sue for her $10 charge.  Limiting an Internet consumer to purely 
contractual remedies will result in under-deterrence.  It is the 
unpredictability of tort law and the remedy of punitive damages 
that make the Internet seller or entrepreneur think twice before 
engaging in wrongful conduct that is profitable but a serious 
social problem to society.  Predatory Internet sellers may perform 
a cost-benefit analysis deciding that it is profitable to cheat 
consumers where the probability of detection is low.  Punitive 
 
 359 Id. at 530. 
 360 Id. 
 361 Id. 
 362 Griffis v. Luban, No. CX-01-1350, 2002 WL 338139, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 
2002). 
 363 Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 537. 
 364 Id. at 536-37. 
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damages are a deterrent to a company because producers cannot 
balance the benefit of chiseling Internet users against the costs of 
detection with any certainty. 
The cheating of countless consumers in cyberspace is 
comparable to the societal wrong described in Walker v. 
Sheldon,365 where the New York Court of Appeals observed: 
[T]hose who deliberately and cooly [sic] engage in a far-flung 
fraudulent scheme, systematically conducted for profit, are 
very much more likely to pause and consider the consequences 
if they have to pay more than the actual loss suffered by an 
individual plaintiff.  An occasional award of compensatory 
damages against such parties would have little deterrent 
effect.  A judgment simply for compensatory damages would 
require the offender to do no more than return the money, 
which he had taken from the plaintiff.  In the calculation of his 
expected profits, the wrongdoer is likely to allow for a certain 
amount of money, which will have to be returned to those 
victims who object too vigorously, and he will be perfectly 
content to bear the additional cost of litigation as the price for 
continuing his illicit business.  It stands to reason that the 
chances of deterring him are materially increased by subjecting 
him to the payment of punitive damages.366 
If the probability of detection is low, there is a greater 
potential that a spam e-mailer will send millions of unwanted e-
mails.  For the Internet merchant tempted to cheat consumers, 
he or she must not be able to coldly calculate the worst-case 
scenario of paying only what was owed in the first place.  
Wrongdoers must know that their financial existence may be 
threatened if they violate Internet business norms.  In Emery-
Waterhouse Co. v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank,367 
the First Circuit Court of Appeals portrayed the retention of 
money not belonging to a bank as conduct analogous to theft.368  
Accordingly, the First Circuit upheld a punitive damages award 
against the assignee.369  There are analogous circumstances in 
this case when it comes to protecting consumers in cyberspace.  
The punishment of Internet defendants who intentionally or 
recklessly breach their obligation to treat consumers fairly sends 
a signal to the information industry.  It is entirely appropriate 
that the states punish conduct that violates a recognized public 
interest and there is no lesser interest in cyberspace. 
 
 
 365 179 N.E.2d 497 (N.Y. 1961). 
 366 Id. at 499. 
 367 757 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 368 Id. at 408. 
 369 Id. at 401. 
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The awarding of punitive damages serves the additional 
purpose of limiting the defendantís ability to profit from its fraud 
by escaping detection and (private) prosecution.  If a tortfeasor is 
ìcaughtî only half the time he commits torts, then, when he or 
she is caught, the tortfeasor should be punished twice as heavily 
in order to make up for the times that he or she actually escaped 
punishment.  As a result, the tortfeasor will be forced to consider 
the cost of being caught, not merely the odds of escaping, even if 
the tortfeasor is only held accountable for a small portion of his 
conduct. 
Punitive damages also serve as a mechanism for ensuring 
that the ìwrongdoer bears all the costs of its actions, and is thus 
appropriately deterred from causing harm, in those categories of 
cases in which compensatory damages alone result in systematic 
underassessment of costs, and hence in systematic 
underdeterrence.î370  The social cost of underdeterrence is that 
actors ìwill have an incentive to undertake activities whose social 
costs exceed their social benefits.î371  Online thieves are using a 
new technique called ìphishingî to steal the identity and credit 
card numbers of consumers.  As briefly mentioned earlier in this 
Article, phishing is the transmittal of e-mails, which appear to 
come from major corporations, to consumers.372  The predator 
directs consumers to fraudulent web sites that mirror the 
companiesí real sites and obtain bank account or credit card 
information from the consumers by asking them to verify or 
update their accounts.373   
The punishment of intentional or reckless breaches of the 
obligation to treat Internet consumers fairly is a necessary signal 
to new industries.  The strong arm of punitive damages is called 
into play to punish firms who play fast and loose with Internet 
usersí money, data, identity, and right to privacy.  Punitive 
damages are the only remedy that is tailored to punish and deter 
e-businesses from engaging in actions contrary to the public 
interest.  The underlying public purpose is to teach fraudulent 
Internet companies that ìtort does not pay.î374  Punitive damages 
encourage plaintiffs to act as ìprivate attorneys generalî and serve 
as an incentive to encourage a plaintiff to sue when there is 
widespread harm.375 
 
 370 Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 243 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J. 
concurring). 
 371 Id. (Calabresi, J. concurring). 
 372 James Covert, Amazon Sues to Stop E-Mails That Use Its Name, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
27, 2003, at D4.  See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
 373 Id. 
 374 Rookes v. Barnard, 1964 A.C. 1129, 1227 (H.L. 1964) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 375 See, e.g., Leslie E. John, Comment, Formulating Standards for Awards of Punitive 
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Deterrence cannot be achieved unless the costs of wrongful 
conduct are sufficient to induce fraudulent Internet wrongdoers 
and others tempted by ill-gotten gains not to repeat the conduct 
again.  The awarding of punitive damages against Internet 
defendants will send a clear message to an e-business corporate 
headquarters or offshore haven that it is risky to defraud 
consumers.  The ultimate goal of punitive damages is to punish 
by taking away the ìill gottenî gain, setting an example, and 
deterring future conduct of a like nature. 
Punitive damages are an efficient remedy to punish and 
deter intentional and reckless torts in situations where ìthe 
probability of detection is very low and the probability of harm is 
very high.î376  Lowering the probability of enforcement implies 
that enforcement costs can be minimized.  The lower that the 
probability of detection is, the fewer the resources devoted to 
enforcement need to be, and the fine can be set high enough so 
that the fine multiplied by the probability of its being imposed 
(the ìexpected fineî) reaches the optimal level for deterrence.377  
A large punitive damages award is necessary to achieve optimal 
deterrence where the probability that any one Internet user will 
uncover wrongdoing is minimal.378 
The Fifth Circuit in Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.379 
stated that ìpunitive damages reward individuals who serve as 
ëprivate attorneys generalí in bringing wrongdoers to account.î380  
Private attorneys general provide a backup in situations in which 
government enforcement agencies fail to adequately protect the 
public.  Fraud in the e-business executive suites will typically be 
more difficult and expensive to detect and prosecute than crime 
in the streets. 
 
Damages in the Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CAL. L. REV. 2033, 2051-52 (1986) 
(arguing that punitive damages are an incentive to sue where the plaintiff might not 
otherwise do so or when the defendant is unlikely to be prosecuted criminally).  See also 
Susan Abramson, Note, Crawling Out from Under Boulder, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 303, 
337-38 (1984) (arguing that private damage remedy fulfills ìprivate attorney generalî 
functions).  The policy behind attorney fee shifting is also justified on a ìprivate attorney 
generalî rationale.  See Thomas D. Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A 
Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 653 (1982) (ì[T]he ëprivate attorney generalí 
theory justifies a fee award on the basis of the public usefulness of advancing a particular 
type of claim.î). 
 376 Thomas Koenig, The Law Arises Out of Fact, Even for a ìPoet Laureate,î 28 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1021, 1033 n.47.  See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. 
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 160-61 (1987). 
 377 See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 
J. POL. ECON. 169, 190-93 (1968). 
 378 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the 
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880, 880-81 (1979). 
 379 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986), abrogation recognized by Centennial Ins. Co. v. 
Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 149 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 380 Id. at 403. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The remedy of punitive damages is particularly well-suited 
to assist consumers in unmasking deliberate, concealed economic 
harms, like those suffered by the victims of computer viruses, 
fraudulent Internet sales and services, and the routine invasions 
of privacy that compromise the identity of users.381  Without 
exemplary damages, the predatory Internet wrongdoers run little 
probability of detection if they injure a large number of consumers 
in relatively minor ways such as through pop-up ads, spam e-mail, 
or hidden charges.  A popular misconception contends that 
punitive damage awards have spun out of control, threatening 
big, vulnerable companies.  This is simply not so.  Punitive 
damages are appropriate where a cyberspace defendant has 
acted in reckless indifference of the rights of large groups of 
consumers with the calculated purpose of making illicit profits.382 
Limiting a consumer cheated in a cyberspace transaction to 
purely contractual remedies will certainly result in diminished 
deterrence.  Despite the theoretical promise of punitive damages 
for protecting consumers, the remedy is stillborn.  Punitive 
damages are particularly needed to punish and deter conduct on 
the borderline between the law of torts and criminal law in 
cyberspace.  Punitive damages are needed now more than ever by 
consumers to detect and punish fraudsters, predators, and other 
online criminals on the World Wide Web.  In cyberspace, punitive 
damages have a potentially useful role of deterring reprehensible 
conduct that, although arguably rational from the standpoint of 
the particular Internet predator, has widespread social costs for 
consumers and for society.  Internet wrongdoers must know they 
cannot estimate the cost of their misdeeds by coldly calculating 
the cost of paying compensatory damages.  Internet con artists 
must know that their financial existence may be threatened by 
shortchanging Internet users, violating their privacy, or trading 
upon their identity. 
 
 381 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, New Light on Punitive Damages, 
REGULATION, Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 33. 
 382 For example, punitive damages have been deemed appropriate against insurance 
companies that chisel small amounts from their policyholders.  See, e.g., Hawkins v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1085 (Ariz. 1987). 
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APPENDIX 
Research Methods for Study of Punitive Damages in Cyberspace 
The term ìInternetî appeared in 1,559 state and federal 
opinions issued in 2002 but only a small percentage of these 
cases appear in the sample because the role of the Internet was 
only incidental in most of this litigation.383  This study examined 
all Internet-related cases in which there was an equitable or 
legal remedy during the years 1992-2002. 
Since no international, federal, or state agency 
systematically collects data on Internet-related cases, all 
available published and unpublished data sources were searched.  
The following sources were exhaustively examined: (1) trial 
verdict reporters;384 (2) LEXIS and WESTLAWís federal and 
state databases and news services;385 (3) cyberspace research 
libraries of law firms;386 (4) national, regional, and local verdict 
reporters;387 (5) reports of domain name disputes;388 (6) 
 
 383 For example, in Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 
2002), the court reviewed the United States Forest Serviceís ìRoadless Area Conservation 
Rule.î  Id. at 1104.  The courtís reference to the Forest Serviceís posting of the rule on its 
web site is not sufficient to qualify the case for the study of cyberspace litigation.  Id. at 
1119. 
 384 The combined jury verdicts and settlements database of LEXIS reports verdicts 
from Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah and Vermont.  Most state verdict reporters cover the entire period of this study 
(1992-2002).  In addition, I examined the National Jury Verdict Review & Analysis, and 
the Combined Jury Verdicts and Settlements sources. 
 385 I examined all federal district court decisions, federal appellate decisions, and 
state appellate decisions reported in WESTLAW and LEXIS.  Searches were conducted 
for internet-related cases using the following searches: (1) hlead (internet or e-mail or web 
or world wide web or worldwide web) and damages or injunction; (2) internet or website or 
web site or world wide web or www and damage or award or injunct! and date  aft  1992; 
(3) atleast3 (Internet or cyberspace or world wide web or e-mail) and verdict or judgment 
and date aft 1992. 
 386 I searched the 300-plus Internet law cases published in the Phillips Nizer Internet 
Law Library.  Martin H. Samson, Internet Library of Law and Court Decisions, at 
http://www.phillipsnizer.com/internetlib.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).  The Seattle law 
firm of Perkins, Coie publishes the Internet Case Digest, which is an online ìcompilation of 
cases designed to bookmark, collate and monitor important developments in Internet law, 
including cases that have significant implications for Internet legal issues even if they are 
not directly related to the Internet.  The Digest includes both filed and decided cases to 
capture the most recent developments as well as new judicial precedents.î  Internet Case 
Digest, at http://www.perkinscoie.com/casedigest/default.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).  
The Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP web site was an important 
resource because of its exhaustive collection of Internet-related trademark cases.  Internet 
Trademark Case Summaries, http://www.finnegan.com/publications/index.cfm?info=trade 
mark (last visited Feb. 19, 2004). 
 387 In WESTLAW, I reviewed the Combined Jury Verdicts and Settlements, which 
included: (1) Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ìATLAî); (2) California Jury 
Verdicts and Judgments; (3) Florida Jury Verdict Reporter; (4) Jury Verdict and 
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individual cyberspace cases reported on law firm web sites;389 (7) 
law school research centers;390 (8) American Law Reports (ìALRî) 
annotations;391 (9) all Internet-related Mealey publications;392 
(10) e-commerce law secondary sources;393 (11) Internet 
treatises;394 (12) legal news services;395 (13) Security and 
Exchange Commission (ìSECî) filings;396 and (14) general news397 
 
Settlement Summaries; and (5) Verdict Settlements.  All of these sources had complete 
data for the years studied. 
 388 I searched the combined domain name disputes and decisions but did not include 
cases channeled to the Uniform Dispute Resolution Procedures (ìUDRPî) developed by 
World Intellectual Property Organization (ìWIPOî).  Since the end of 1999, most domain 
name disputes have been decided by one or three person alternate dispute resolution 
panels rather than by the federal courts.  As part of the process of registering a domain 
name, the registrant agrees to submit complaints filed by third parties to alternative 
dispute resolution panels.  These proceedings are quick, inexpensive, and adjudicate 
domain name disputes between litigants in different countries.  Panels have the limited 
power of ordering the transfer or cancellation of domain names and cannot award 
damages, attorneyís fees, or costs. Unlike court cases, the UDRP are informal, non-
appealable, and stare decisis is not followed.  The sample of domain name cases is limited 
to those filed in federal court under the Federal Dilution Act of 1995 and the Anti-
Cybersquatting Act of 1998. 
 389 Law firms frequently report individual ìvictoriesî in their web site marketing 
materials.  A number of law firms compile cyberlaw verdicts won by other firms. 
 390 The UCLA Online Institute for Cyberspace Law and Policy compiles the leading 
Internet law cases by year.  The UCLA Online Institute for Cyberspace Law and Policy, at 
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/iclp/hp.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).  The Berkman Center 
for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School was also searched.  The Berkman Center for 
Internet & Society, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home (last visited Feb. 15, 2004). 
 391 An online database of all Internet-related annotations in American Law Reports 
(ìALRî) was extensively searched. 
 392 My content analysis of reported cases focused upon Cyber Tech & E-Commerce: 
Mealeyís Litigation Report, Emerging Insurance Disputes: Mealeyís Litigation Report, 
Intellectual Property: Mealeyís Litigation Report, Litigation: Mealeyís Combined Reports, 
Patents: Mealeyís Litigation Report, and Trademarks: Mealeyís Litigation Report. 
 393 I searched the commercial law, computer law, and e-commerce secondary 
literature.  I conducted searches of Matthew Benderís UCC Reporter and Digest as well as 
the following Bender treatises: E-Commerce and Communications: Transactions in 
Digital Information, Nimmer on Copyright, Gilson on Trademark Protection & Practice, 
Intellectual Property Counseling and Litigation, Computer Contracts, Computer Law, 
and Law of the Internet. 
 394 During the period of the study, I updated four editions of the E-Business Legal 
Handbook (2003).  All of the cases uncovered in each yearís edition were included in the 
research universe.  Other treatises searched were: Julian S. Millstein et. al., DOING 
BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET (2002); Kevin J. Connolly, LAW OF INTERNET OF SECURITY & 
PRIVACY (2002); Ian Ballon, E-COMMERCE & INTERNET LAW (2001). 
 395 The principal source here was the LEXIS library of legal news newsletters and 
publications.  However, I also surveyed the general news databases as well as the 
combined news databases from the states compiled by WESTLAW.  WESTLAW includes 
all Dow Jones magazines, newspapers, and wires, as well as other magazine databases.  
Both services have extensive libraries of newswires and news services providing 
additional information on case developments. 
 396 Corporate annual reports to shareholders were examined on LEXISís FEDSEC 
database, as well as the SEC Edgar databases.  Companies are required to disclose 
pending or settlement cases that may affect stock prices.  LEXIS has complete SEC filings 
and exhibits in its online database. 
 397 Newspapers and popular magazines were analyzed on many LEXIS and 
WESTLAW databases. 
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and information services.398  The sample excludes all criminal 
cases as well as dispositions for convicted offenders who are 
challenging the constitutionality of Internet postings of their 
criminal records and personal information.399  The sample 
excluded Internet-related small claims actions because there is 
no reliable reporting service.400  The sample does not include 
discovery orders to produce computer tapes or other information.  
The dataset does not include disputes decided under alternative 
dispute resolution such as the Uniform Domain Name Resolution 
Policy. 
Furthermore, the sample does not include criminal 
prosecutions, regulatory actions brought by governmental units, 
or bankruptcies.  Regulatory, criminal, and dot-com insolvency 
involves the government as the adjudicator of rights.  These 
public law subjects are sharply different than private litigation, 
so they will be examined in a separate article.401  The focus of 
this Article is on the role of private litigants in Internet 
litigation.  Foreign litigants are included only to the extent that 
actions are tried in U.S. state and federal courts. 
 
 
 398 I systematically searched the extensive collection of computer law and cyberlaw 
publications on LEXIS and WESTLAW.  Sources include: all Andrew Publications 
Newsletters on Internet-related topics, Computer Law Newsletters, Leader Publications 
Newsletters, and the published outlines of the Practicing Law Institute. 
 399 This Article focuses on civil litigation rather than criminal or quasi-criminal 
cyberspace cases where the plaintiff was a governmental agency or prosecutor. 
 400 In the state of Washington, there are newspaper reports of small claims courts 
ordering commercial e-mailers to compensate consumers.  However, the complete absence 
of written opinions or other records makes it impossible to determine what role these 
informal tribunals play in the overall picture. 
 401 The research includes a content analysis of every FTC litigation report and SEC 
litigation release from 1995 to 2003.  The FTC asserts broad investigative and law 
enforcement authority to police Internet fraud.  The FTC uncovers many of its cases by 
enlisting volunteers to surf web sites in order to uncover get rich schemes, false 
advertising, miracle cures, privacy infractions, online pyramid schemes, credit card billing 
schemes, and other deceptive sales practices.  Most FTC actions are based on the 
Commissionís broad enforcement authority to restrain ìunfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce.î  15 U.S.C. ß 45(a)(1) (2003).  Similarly, the SEC has 
been active in extending federal securities law to the enforcement of predatory, anti-fraud 
and anti-competitive practices in cyberspace.  SEC actions may be brought for insider 
trading, pyramid schemes, fraudulent investment opportunities, and false and misleading 
information about securities and the companies that issue them.  U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov (last visited  Feb. 15, 2003). 
